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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to examine the applicability of established manned
aircraft test techniques and processes to the testing of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs). While the paper is largely focused on the Naval Aviation perspective, input
from several joint programs as well as some Air Force and Army testing is included. In
addition, although handled differently, the testing of the Tomahawk Cruise Missile is also
considered. Processes associated with test planning, risk mitigation and airworthiness are
considered in some detail. Much of this document is drawn from UAV flight test
experience compiled in a draft Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and
Development (AGARD) paper for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) paper
by the author.
Given the enormous range in size, speed, and complexity of UAV systems
examined, it is not surprising to find that numerous conclusions can be drawn. This
paper attempts to categorize both the air vehicles and their associated systems to facilitate
the analysis. There are many standard flight test techniques that can easily be applied to
UAV systems with excellent results. The same is true of many of the processes
associated with flight test planning and execution. However, it is also evident that it is
beneficial and in many cases necessary to adapt, or tailor, both the techniques and the
processes to efficiently test a given system. A prime example of modifying test
techniques is evident with many of the smaller systems that cannot support the type of
instrumentation normally associated with manned aircraft flight test. Similarly, with
respect to processes, airworthiness requirements often need to be tailored in consideration
of the actual risk, cost, capability and benefit provided by the system. By definition,
testing of an unmanned vehicle presents no risk to the pilot/operator. If control by failsafe, or flight termination device can eliminate risk to property, the robustness of the
design can be far below what may be considered acceptable for a manned aircraft,
without creating significant safety issues.
Recommendations include process improvements to permit UAV programs to
evolve without excessive restrictions based on manned aircraft requirements. These
processes should be based on system’s characteristics and an assessment of the risks
associated with the test and mission constraints of the system. Adaptation of evolving
technology may be used to further refine and improve existing flight test techniques for
UAV systems. Further research is recommended in the form of a statistical study of total
UAV and cruise missile flight test mishaps, fatalities, and property damage as a function
of total flight hours to validate the risk level and support process improvement.
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INTRODUCTION
While Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Remotely Piloted Vehicles have been seen duty
with various forces around the world since fairly early in the twentieth century, the
technology spurred by microprocessors in the last two decades has expanded their
capability and value exponentially. The value gained by preventing the loss of human
life (or prisoner of war/hostage situations) during dangerous operations, as well as the
ability to eliminate life support and egress systems has gradually exceeded the cost of
integrating the required technology. In addition, this technology growth has improved
reliability by allowing use of redundant and fault tolerant systems.
This document represents an effort to research and document lessons learned and
experiences highlighting the unique differences between testing manned and unmanned
air vehicles. It is intended to provide a practical set of guidelines in support of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and Unmanned (or Uninhabited) Combat Air Vehicle
(UCAV) testing. While the physical laws governing the flight of aircraft are not
influenced by the presence or absence of a pilot, many of the practices developed for the
collection of data from ground and flight test events require changes in approach or new
techniques when the air vehicle is unmanned.
As such, this document focuses on the differences required for a test program for
unmanned air vehicles. The scope is intended to capture those differences throughout the
program including the test planning and risk management phase through the operational
suitability and effectiveness assessment.
Air Vehicle Categories – An overview of UAV testing represents no small task given
the exponential growth in the number, configurations, and complexity of UAV systems
over the last decade. An attempt is made here to provide insight on a large variety of
systems to point out the differences in the testing requirements dictated by the capability
of the system and the intended mission. While no all-encompassing definition has been
applied to the various UAV systems currently fielded or under development, they are
typically broken down into some or all of the following categories:
Micro – This term generally refers to vehicles with weight less than two pounds, and
extremely small physical dimensions. Such systems may carry eaves dropping,
chemical/biological agent detection circuitry, or meteorological sensors.
Small – A variety of platforms have been defined as “small” UAVs. Typically these air
vehicles are capable of carrying payloads in the 5 to 20 pound range, and have endurance
on the order of 2 to 5 hours. Missions such as surveillance, reconnaissance, and battle
damage assessment are often conducted.
Tactical – Tactical UAVs are intended to support operations at the Brigade or similar
sized unit level. They typically have the capability to carry 20 to 75 pound stabilized
electro-optical or infrared payloads to ranges of about 100 kilometers, and provide
1

endurance of 4 to 8 hours. In addition to the missions described for the small UAV,
tactical systems may have targeting and target designating capabilities.
Medium Altitude and Endurance (MAE) – These platforms are often equivalent in size
to some manned aircraft and may exceed several thousand pounds in takeoff weight.
Twelve or more hours of endurance at altitude in the 15,000 to 30,000 foot range would
be typical for this type of system. Large payloads and in some cases satellite data links
for use beyond line of sight are also used. While electro-optical payloads are still
frequently employed, synthetic aperture radar and moving target indicators may also be
employed to support theater-wide intelligence collection.
High Altitude and Endurance (HAE) – Generally very large turbojet or turbofan air
vehicles capable of extended operations above 50,000 feet, with endurance in excess of
24 hours. The very long range of these systems dictates command and control systems
that have beyond line of sight capability. Missions conducted by HAE systems generally
of a strategic focus and may include all of the missions and payloads described in the
previous paragraphs.
Flight Control Categories – Air Vehicle classifications, which are based primarily on
size, weight, and performance of the air vehicle, are not always sufficient in defining test
requirements, or even defining the system as a whole. System complexity is a key factor
in developing a test plan and incorporating the appropriate techniques. Factors such as
data link bandwidth will help determine instrumentation requirements. Launch and
recovery systems require special attention and may vary from simple rolling takeoff and
landings, to systems as complex as the air vehicle itself. Flight control interface is the
final topic for this introduction, and provides another convenient, but by no means
comprehensive method of classification. The following classifications of flight control
modes will be used in this discussion of UAV/UCAV test techniques:
Rate Control – The most basic of control modes, rate control provides a direct link
between the input device (usually a joystick) and the position of the flight control
surfaces. While this mode provides the most similarity to manned aircraft stability and
control, and handling quality testing, it lacks any proportional stick force for pilot
feedback. It also represents the mode that requires the highest level of pilot motor skills
and the associated training. For this reason, many UAV/UCAV programs are avoiding
use of this mode to reduce operator training costs. Rate control has been typically used in
small to tactical size vehicles, but is becoming less common even in these. Rate control
can be used to operate a UAV in either the Internal (operator is looking at video and or
instruments in the ground control station), or external (operator is looking at the air
vehicle from outside the ground control station) mode. Obviously, the mode of control
can lead to pilot induced oscillation in the presence of excessive latency in the data or
video. This in turn forces a requirement for sufficient data link bandwidth.
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Stability Augmentation or Autopilot Control – Using the stability augmentation or
autopilot control mode, the operator makes inputs to the autopilot outer loop such as
heading, altitude, or airspeed changes, and the autopilot or stability augmentation system
(SAS) manipulates the flight control surfaces. Operator inputs can be made by stick
position, control knob position, or increasingly via computer interface selections. SAS or
autopilot control is also referred to as vector control, and is typically operated in the
internal mode, but can be used externally as well. A lower level of situational awareness
and hence lower data rates may be sufficient given the increased stability.
Fully Autonomous Operations – In this mode the air vehicle executes all flight
maneuvers based on a set of instructions uploaded to the air vehicle or stored in the
ground control station prior to flight. This flight control mode is typically backed up by
one or both of the previous flight control modes. Changes in the set of instructions (or
flight plan) can often be made in flight by loading a new set. This is often referred to as
dynamic re-tasking.
In summary, testing of UAV and UCAV systems is in fact different in many cases from
manned vehicle testing. This is not only due to the techniques required because there is
no pilot on board, but also to the compound nature of the UAV/UCAV system. Ground
control stations, launch and recovery systems, data links, payloads, and often, other
systems must all be considered in the test process if a suitable and effective UAV/UCAV
is to be the end product.
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CHAPTER 1
RISK MANAGEMENT
As a precursor to flight testing, it is prudent to assess hazards and implement processes
and procedures to manage risk. Processes and procedures inherent to testing of manned
aircraft frequently have to be adapted to accommodate UAV technologies and
capabilities, and new approaches have to be developed to address considerations unique
to UAVs. Four key processes used in risk management of UAV flight testing include:
1. Airworthiness/Design Assessment
2. Configuration Control
3. Range Clearance
4. Test Planning.
Airworthiness – Some type of airworthiness process using design data and/or
preliminary ground/flight test data is essential to minimize the risk of inherent design
flaws progressing into a flight test program. Due to the varied nature of UAV systems as
discussed above, this process should be tailored to suit the complexity and requirements
of the UAV system. In any event, the airworthiness process or assessment should be
conducted from a system perspective as technical risk may reside in Ground Control
Stations (GCS), launch and recovery, or other systems as well as the air vehicle itself.
The result of this process is generally a document referred to as an airworthiness
certificate, flight clearance, or flight approval. The document governing U.S. Navy UAV
airworthiness is reference (1) the NAVAIRINST 13034.2 of 15 August 2000.
Typically, the airworthiness process involves an independent review of the engineering
behind the system. Qualified engineers are used to review drawings, analyses, data
packages, and test data for the purpose of ensuring that proper consideration has been
given to the various elements of the design, and that no errors have been introduced, and
no oversight of key issues has been committed. Areas of consideration are as varied as
the UAV systems themselves, but frequently include engineering assessments of
functional areas such as; structures, performance, propulsion, electro-magnetic effects,
electrical loads, software, communications, human factors, and system safety.
This process is well defined for manned aircraft and weapons systems. The unique
aspect of assessing the airworthiness of UAV/UCAV systems is the need to tailor the
process to the system. As discussed in the introduction, UAV systems are not easily
categorized. Size, level of complexity, and mode of control combine to allow systems
that span a continuum of risk. Taking an extreme case, it is easy to see that a low cost
micro, or small UAV program cannot support a process that requires extensive
documentation such as finite element analyses, or complex data packages. Risk
management of such systems is often handled by restricting the envelope and requiring
that all flights be conducted in restricted airspace over unpopulated areas. These
restrictions can later be relaxed as the system matures, and demonstrates via accumulated
flight hours and testing, that the appropriate level of airworthiness has been attained.
4

Conversely, programs using a large, complex, and relatively expensive air vehicle would
most likely require an airworthiness assessment essentially equivalent to that of a manned
aircraft, with the obvious exception of Aircrew Life Support Systems (ALSS).
One area that deserves special attention when considering UAV airworthiness is
electromagnetic compatibility. Manned aircraft with digital flight control systems also
must consider, and assess this risk, but none of these are as susceptible as a UAV system
to the problems associated with this issue. The UAV relies on RF transmission of all
flight control data and operator input, as well as status and system health monitoring. For
this reason, ground testing with all systems operating, including engine and generator, is
generally required by UAV airworthiness or flight clearance approvals. The test requires
operation of all radio links in all modes to verify proper operation of all flight controls,
and will be addressed in more detail in the flight testing section of this document.
A second critical consideration for UAVs requiring continuous control links is how the
system responds to lost communications with the ground control station. Programs vary
from immediate flight termination to prevent the air vehicle from leaving the test range,
to complex flight paths to attempt to reacquire the signal and navigation (avoiding
terrain) to a safe field for an autonomous landing. A more detailed discussion of this
subject will be included in the range safety and flight test sections.
Configuration Control - While an airworthiness process as described above, is used to
ensure that the design of the system is airworthy, it is essentially a useless endeavor if the
configuration of the system tested does not accurately reflect the system design. In the
early years of UAV testing and development, it was not unusual for the system to be
handled more like a ground vehicle, or a piece of test equipment than like an aircraft.
This predictably led to numerous incidents and mishaps due to attempted operations with
incomplete maintenance or modifications. In order to understand and manage these risks,
it is imperative that the configuration of the air vehicle and all flight critical system
components, including ground elements, be maintained in a configuration consistent with
that documented by the airworthiness review process. This documentation can take many
forms, and is typically consistent with manned aircraft configuration control and tracking.
Maintenance action forms or modification tracking sheets are typical of the
documentation used. Regardless of the form taken, it is critical that any changes to the
configuration be considered in light of their potential impact on the overall system.
Impacts on weight and balance, flight controls, operator station displays, and navigation
should be carefully considered prior to approving the new configuration for flight. With
the increasing complexity, and software dependence of unmanned aviation systems, it is
especially important that even minor changes to the baseline code be carefully reviewed,
and that regression testing is conducted to ensure that there is no adverse impact on
critical systems. Depending on system architecture, payload changes and changes to
payload control software can have such an impact on navigation and mission computer
operation. Extensive ground testing of all flight control modes is generally required to
ensure that this does not happen, and that the new software is ready for flight. This
process need not be as intensive as the original airworthiness certification, but does
5

require that a subset of the airworthiness process and personnel analyze and test the
results of the modification prior to approval of flight operations. Again, the fact that
UAV systems can, and do run over the full spectrum of cost and complexity, there is a
need to tailor this process to account for the nature of the system to be tested.
Range Clearance – The documents discussed previously in this section are intended to
ensure that the system to be tested is in fact airworthy, and capable of operating over the
test envelope. By contrast, the range clearance is intended as a means to protect all
personnel and property in the event that a major system failure does occur. Some of the
factors that impact the range safety assessment are air vehicle size/weight, speed, system
complexity, hazardous materials on board, redundancy of critical systems, and flight
termination. In the United States, the Range Commanders Council (RCC) has issued a
set of guidelines for UAV range safety and range clearance. This document is listed as
reference (2). While many of the items considered in assessing the range safety are very
similar to those considered in the flight clearance, or airworthiness process, the
distinction is the purpose of the assessment. It is entirely possible for a system that has
been determined to be airworthy to be unacceptable for a range clearance by virtue of the
fact that a failure would prevent the vehicle from being kept within range boundaries.
Conversely, a vehicle or system not considered to be airworthy due to an unacceptably
high probability of a flight critical failure, may be an acceptable range safety risk if it
employs fail-safe, or flight termination systems guaranteed to keep the vehicle in a safe
area during any failure.
The critical elements of any range safety assessment will include the following:
1. Critical System Redundancy
2. Air Vehicles Size, Weight, and Speed
3. Fail Safe, or Flight Termination System
Critical System Redundancy - Critical system redundancy provides a means by which
the air vehicle can be safely recovered in the event of a primary system failure. Inherent
with this redundancy is the need for an alert, caution, or warning system to provide the
pilot/operator with notification of a failure. This provides the situational awareness
needed for the pilot/operator to take appropriate action, and for the range safety official to
direct the planned procedure to be executed. It is important to note that there are critical
systems on the ground as well as in the air vehicle. For example, it is generally required
that fully redundant command and control data links be employed for UAV testing.
Switching from primary to back-up command and control link may be automatic, or
operator selected. Ideally, the back-up link consists of all required subsystems including
the pilot/operator interface (control box), radio encoder, amplifier, and antenna system.
Similarly, redundant power to the ground control station in the form of an alternating
current supply, backed up by storage batteries or an uninterruptible power supply is
highly desired. Back-up power supplies, both on the ground and in the air vehicle should
be of sufficient capacity to provide for safe recovery from the maximum range planned
for the flight. Flight control systems pose a more difficult problem on smaller air
6

vehicles due to the size, weight, and complexity involved in fully redundant flight
controls. Typically, a properly sized actuator should pose a very low failure risk.
Providing a separate route to the actuator via redundant mission and navigation
computers is one method that has been used. Use of a manual rate, or stability
augmented manual mode, which bypasses the primary avionics, and allows access to the
flight control actuators is another method. It is important to remember that the range
safety assessment is considered as a whole. The above-discussed measures are not
necessarily hard requirements, providing that procedures or design ensure that personnel
injury and property damage can be avoided despite loss of the air vehicle.
Air Vehicle Size, Weight, and Speed – Air vehicle size, weight, and speed are the
parameters required to analyze the distance that a disabled air vehicle will travel as well
as the kinetic energy that will be imparted upon ground impact. Obviously, the ability of
the vehicle to glide during some failure modes must be assessed as well. The lift to drag
ratio (L/D) of the vehicle is generally used as a predictor for this case. It may be possible
to reduce this value based on other factors such as an unstable spiral mode. In addition,
any hazardous material such as fuel, batteries, and other consumables may increase the
hazard area of the vehicle. By using this data in conjunction with the fail-safe/flight
termination data discussed in the following section, the range safety officials can develop
a hazard pattern or “footprint” for the system. This hazard pattern can, in turn be used to
develop flight routes within the test range, which ensure a minimal risk to personnel and
property. One discussion that frequently develops when conducting this analysis
concerns safe altitude. The obvious conclusion is that the lower the air vehicle is flown,
the smaller the hazard footprint, and therefore, the safer the operation will be. This
neglects the increased probability of an unnecessary mishap due to terrain avoidance
workload, and the reduced reaction time available to the pilot/operator. When not
dictated by test data requirements, the altitude should generally be a compromise between
these conflicting issues.
Fail-Safe, or Flight Termination System – The Fail-Safe, or Flight Termination System
(FTS) provides a means by which the vehicle may be maintained within range boundaries
even if a failure results in a vehicle crashing. Like UAV systems themselves, the failsafe and flight termination systems available run over a wide range of size, weight, and
complexity. Small UAV systems frequently employ Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS)
command link encoder and decoder circuits. The majority of these devices employ a failsafe function that allows the operator to program the controller to either maintain the last
control surface position (hold mode), or set the control surfaces to a desired position
(failsafe mode) if the command link is lost. In general, use of the hold mode is highly
undesirable, as it could allow the vehicle to depart the range in uncontrolled flight if the
failure occurs with controls neutral. The more stable the air vehicle, the more likely it
will fly a long distance under these conditions. Using the fail-safe mode to set the control
surfaces for level flight with power is equally undesirable. Range restrictions usually call
for the throttle to be set to idle power, or engine shut down, and flight controls to glide
positions. In extreme conditions, where range space is limited and risk of injury exists
outside of the controlled airspace, it may be required that the controls be set to cause an
7

immediate crash to ensure that the vehicle stays in bounds. This is often accomplished by
programming pro spin control positions and engine to idle. Since the fail-safe mode can
be triggered by a temporary loss of command link, it is advisable to use engine idle vice
shut down, as a controlled recovery may be possible. Further discussion on the use of
COTS components will be presented in the small UAV test section of this document.
Larger, more complex UAV systems (and even many small systems) may employ an
avionics package capable of at least limited autonomous control. In many cases a
mission and/or navigation computer monitor the air vehicle location relative to the
Ground Control Station (GCS). This can be used to provide a higher level of fail-safe
capability. This advanced mode may include an autonomous return if the command link
is lost. This “Return Home” mode may also allow the operator to program the home
destination. By choosing a destination that allows a safe ditching area, while providing
close range for the command link, the operator can maximize the probability of a safe
recovery while ensuring that the range boundary is not violated. The return home
navigation avionics may be enabled by inputs from an Inertial Navigation System (INS),
Global Positioning System (GPS), or by Dead Reckoning updates from the command link
directional antenna azimuth and elevation.
The next higher form of fail-safe, and last to be discussed, is employed on more recent,
and typically larger UAV systems. These systems are capable of significant autonomous
operations including navigation and terrain clearance with no command link. As opposed
to a simple return-home mode, these systems may be programmed with one or more
entire emergency plans. These plans are then executed based on entry criteria including
loss of command link. The plan may include recovery at the original launch site, or an
abort to a recovery site closer to the air vehicle’s present location. It is typical for these
systems to make use of INS, GPS, and dead reckoning data with a graceful degradation to
lesser modes in the event of failure(s). The emergency plan may include a climb, hold, or
navigation through numerous waypoints at numerous altitudes prior to autonomous
recovery. This capability can greatly improve both range and operational safety. Of
course, the cost, in addition to dollars is the need to thoroughly test all of the emergency
modes in addition to the normal flight modes.
In some cases, typically when large high-speed vehicles are involved, a flight termination
system completely independent of the UAV system may be required. Such systems may
also be required if the UAV system cannot satisfy range safety requirements based on the
assessment described in the previous paragraphs of this section. These systems may
simply disable the air vehicle engine, cause departure from controlled flight, eject an
emergency parachute, or even cause the airborne destruction of the vehicle, as in missile
and rocket tests, where the speed and high volume of hazardous fuel requires such action.
Flight termination systems require a high degree of reliability, and must be tested to
ensure that there is no degradation of the flight termination, or UAV system, due to
electromagnetic effects. Any flight termination system must be proven capable of
operating at a range equal to, or in excess of the maximum range planned for any flight
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test. These systems are employed for flight testing and generally not used once the UAV
system has been proven operationally suitable and reliable.
Test Planning – Test plans come in all shapes and sizes. While military and some
contractor test plans follow strict formats, they do vary when compared to each other.
There is also variation in the test planning requirements of the individual services
depending on the scope of the project. This document will focus on the portions of the
test plan, which deal directly with risk management or risk reduction. While it can be
argued that these are not UAV specific issues, the considerations involved do vary from
manned aircraft test planning. The tendency to assume greater risk to the air vehicle in
light of the fact the there is no human on board to suffer injury is obvious. There are in
fact cases where this is a logical conclusion. In most cases however, a disciplined
approach can reduce the risk to the air vehicle and therefore the program. This is
especially important as UAV systems continue to grow in size, complexity, and cost.
The elements of any good test plan that deal specifically with risk reduction typically
include the following:
1. Test Hazard Analysis
2. Test Specific Emergency Procedures
3. Safety Checklist
Test Hazard Analysis - The Test Hazard Analysis is a document which seeks first to
identify all hazards or risks associated with the proposed testing, then to rate those
hazards in terms of both severity and probability, and then to identify means by which the
hazards can be reduced. The risk remaining (residual risk) following the imposition of
this risk reduction is used to rate the overall test risk. This rating can then be used to
drive overall test strategies such as level of review, range or airspace restrictions, or test
envelope restriction. Format is much less important than content and diligence in
considering the possible failure modes and their impact on flight safety. For clarity
however, a sample of the format used by the United States Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) is presented here. Table 1 presents a Test Hazard Analysis Matrix for
evaluating risk. It is important to note that the Test Hazard Analysis should be based on
test specific hazards. In other words, a system that has undergone extensive testing and
fielding, which is testing a new subsystem integration, would not require analysis of other
subsystems that are unrelated. Conversely, testing of a prototype UAV will require an
extensive Test Hazard Analysis of all safety of flight related subsystems. A failure
modes analysis provided by the designers, if available, provides an excellent basis for
developing such a Test Hazard Analysis. Those failure modes that pose a risk of loss of
the air vehicle, injury, or property damage must be considered, and appropriate corrective
action employed. Actions such as proficiency, training, and simulator runs may be used
to help mitigate risks.
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Table 1
TEST HAZARD ANALYSIS MATRIX
Hazard Probability
A - Frequent:
Likely
to
occur
immediately or within a
short time period of time.
B - Probable:
Probably will occur in
time.
C
- May occur in time.
Occasional:
D - Remote:
Unlikely to occur.

I - Catastrophic:
II - Critical:
III - Marginal:
IV - Negligible:

Hazard Severity
May cause
aircraft loss.

death

or

May cause severe injury or
major aircraft damage.
May cause injury or minor
aircraft damage.
Will not result in injury or
aircraft damage.

Applying the preceding guidelines to each test event provides the basis for making a risk
assessment for each test event defined in the test matrix. Individual element risk
categories are assigned using the residual risk matrix specified in Table 2.
Table 3 presents the assessment for each hazard. This assessment can be refined by
adding additional precautionary measures or mitigation factors if the residual risk falls in
a category considered too high by the test team or program management.
Test Specific Emergency Procedures - Test Specific Emergency Procedures must be
developed in order to ensure timely response by the pilot/operator in the event of a
system failure during flight. These procedures should be developed jointly between the
pilots/operators and the flight test engineers. In addition to documentation, the
procedures should be studied, understood, and rehearsed on the ground. They should also
be prepared in the form of flight cards, or Pilot Operating Handbook (NATOPS, Dash 10,
etc.) for access during the flights. Those procedures that are most urgent should be
committed to memory. These procedures are included in the test plan to ensure that
proper review is included in the test plan approval process. This review process can take
a number of forms, but typically a review board is preferred to a serial review. The board
should consist of individuals with test experience with emphasis on safety as well as
operations. As with the Test Hazard Analysis and as implied by the name, this
documentation should only address procedures required as a direct result of the
system/subsystem under test. The standard flight manual for the system should cover the
appropriate procedures for all other in-flight emergencies. In the case of prototype
system testing, it is critical that a draft flight manual be created, and to the greatest extent
possible, validated during ground testing prior to flight. This is no minor task and should
be considered up front. As with the Test Hazard Analysis, a failure modes analysis
generated by the design team is an invaluable document. As with all emergency
procedures, immediate action items should be committed to memory.
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Table 2
TEST HAZARD ANALYSIS RESIDUAL RISK MATRIX

HAZARD
PROBABILITY

I
Catastrophic

A – Frequent
B – Probable
C – Occasional
D – Remote

UA3
UA3
Note 1
Note 2

HAZARD SEVERITY
II
III
Critical
Marginal
UA3
Category C4
Category C4
Note 2

Category C4
Category C4
Category B5
Category A6

IV
Negligible
Category B5
Category A6
Category A6
Category A6

Notes:
(1) The determination of a test project whose residual risk assessment falls under I/C will require up front
discussions with the TCT prior to proceeding with the test program development.
(2) Assignment of Risk Category where residual risk falls under I/D or II/D will require up front
discussions with the TCT to determine whether Risk Category A or B is applicable.
(3) UA - Unacceptable risk. Project residual risk too high to proceed.
(4) Risk Category C - Test or activities that present a significant risk to personnel, equipment or property,
even after all precautionary/corrective actions are taken.
(5) Risk Category B - Test or activities that present a greater risk to personnel, equipment or property than
normal operations.
(6) Risk Category A - Test or activities that presents no greater risk than normal operations.
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Table 3
SAMPLE TEST HAZARD ANALYSIS
HAZARDOUS
CONDITION

CAUSE

EFFECT

CORRECTIVE
ACTION

PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE

1. None.
UAV is
unrecoverable.
1. Attempt to
switch control
station (PCS or
GCS).
2. RTB.

1. Conduct ground preflight
checks to verify proper operation.

Loss of vehicle control /
collateral damage

Autopilot
Failure

Control of UAV is lost
with loss of airplane.

Loss of vehicle control /
collateral damage

PEDU Failure

Aircraft flies
preprogrammed Return
Home or Glide Mode with
potential loss of airplane.
May regain control.

Loss of vehicle control /
collateral damage

EMI caused by
external
emitters

MIAG processors are
disrupted, UAV control is
lost with loss of airplane.
May regain control

Loss of vehicle control /
collateral damage

Link
loss
immediately
after
takeoff
with UAV at
low altitude

UAV will turn
immediately toward RH
point, and might not have
sufficient altitude to clear
airfield buildings and
obstructions.

Failure to fly correct R/H
heading in DR mode

Incorrect
magnetometer
heading output
combined with
a failure of the
MC processor.

UAV will terminate
return home flight at an
incorrect location

1. Attempt to
switch control
station (PCS or
GCS).
2. RTB.
1. Attempt to
switch control
station (PCS or
GCS).
2. RTB.
1. None
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HAZARD
SEVERITY /
HAZARD
PROBABILITY
I/D

1. Conduct ground preflight
checks to verify proper operation.
2. Monitor data link performance
during flight testing.
5. Monitor instrumented
parameters real-time.
1. MIAG is designed to be
hardened against EMI to 200
V/m, and uses filter pins on the
ADIO inputs.

II/D

1. Program first RH point beyond
departure end of active runway
into UAV to permit UAV to
climb straight ahead for lowaltitude RH; reprogram UAV with
mission RH point once safe
altitude is reached.
1. Conduct ground test phase to
ensure that magnetometer output
is correct after alignment before
proceeding to flight test.

I/D

II/D

I/D

The Safety Checklist - The Safety Checklist, as instituted by the Naval Air Systems
Command, consists of a series of standard questions for all UAV flight testing that is
intended to assure that all “lessons learned”, and appropriate preparations have been
incorporated into the plan. The checklist is essentially a double-check of all
configuration, envelope, and procedural actions implemented to minimize risk. The
safety checklist is typically included as a written attachment to the test plan, and requires
written answers to the standard set of questions. Yes and No answers are not considered
adequate. If a question is not applicable to the test, the reason should be stated. All
pilots/operators as well as required test team personnel should sign the safety checklist.
Fully autonomous systems may also require that contingency planning for various
mission abort criteria be planned and pre-programmed. This planning may be based in
part on the hazard analysis and serve as a mitigating factor. If the system is equipped
with sufficient redundancy or fail-safe capability, it can safely recover at alternate
airfields, providing the proper mission planning was done. This requires that the
operators and engineers fully understand the failure mode and what limitations it places
on the system. Simulation of the failures through fault insertion is invaluable in verifying
the contingency or abort criteria prior to flight.1

1

Mark Watson, Global Hawk Test Team, Eglin AFB
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CHAPTER 2
GROUND TESTING
While this document is focused on the unique aspects of UAV/UCAV flight testing,
experience and common sense dictate that some consideration be given to the importance
of ground testing. Quality ground testing is essential not only to reduce the risk of
mishap, but also to ensure that the system is technically ready for the flight testing to
follow. The time and money expended on the ground is often repaid many-fold by
enabling success during the typically high-visibility flight testing phase. Unfortunately,
this is not always obvious when a project is successful, but a close look at failed flight
tests and mishaps often indicates that the underlying problems could have easily been
discovered and fixed prior to flight.
Modeling and Simulation - A detailed description of several critical ground test phases
will be preceded here with a brief discussion on the importance of modeling and
simulation in support of UAV ground and flight test. Many current UAV systems, even
those smaller and less expensive systems, make use of integrated avionics packages.
Frequently these packages provide inertial stabilization, GPS navigation, air data
computers, navigation computers, mission computers, and/or flight control computers in
a single package or “black box”. This approach has led to numerous advances in cost,
weight savings, reliability, and integration time savings. However, this approach can also
present the tester with a difficult problem when trying to verify functionality during
ground testing. Because many of the functions requiring testing and verification take
place at the circuit card or even microprocessor level, it can be nearly impossible to check
point to point message generation and transfer. A thorough test requires that some means
of injecting all of the relevant stimuli and reading all of the relevant responses be
included with such systems. This is a design issue, but must be driven by the tester if a
reasonable level of confidence is to be gained prior to first flight. In older systems with
analogue, non-integrated avionics and sensors, this testing was typically accomplished by
“fooling or spoofing” individual sensors and examining the system response. .
The same issue should be considered with respect to the Ground Control Station and even
the Data Link sub-system. The ability to force the system into a simulated flight mode
with a high fidelity (preferably a six degree of freedom) model residing in the GCS or
avionics system (if not both), facilitates quality ground testing and improves risk
reduction. It also reduces the time and effort required to find and fix problems by
allowing isolation to the message containing the error. Unfortunately, the costs associated
with verification and validation of simulation and modeling frequently preclude their use
for operational evaluations
System Integration Test (SIT) – System Integration Testing is a critical phase, which
typically takes place in a lab environment following individual component and subsystem
testing. In most cases this is the first time that all of the components and subsystems are
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exercised in the intended operational configuration. Historically, too little time and
resources have been allocated for this effort as it is typically the last phase before formal
Developmental Testing (DT) begins. Any schedule slippage that occurs during
development usually results in compression of the time allotted for SIT. In addition,
configuration management must be in place at the start of SIT, adding to the time
required to implement the changes needed to fix the inevitable discrepancies that will be
discovered. SIT is intended to find the problems not picked up in the Functional
Requirements traces and Interface Control Documents used in the system design. These
critical documents are required and useful, but there are nearly always oversight or
interpretation issues and SIT is the place to find and fix them. The SIT test set up should
include the Ground Control Station, Air Vehicle, Data Links, Launch and Recovery
Systems, and any other subsystems required for the system to execute the mission. This
test and many of the follow on ground test phases should include verification of control
surface rigging. Neutral positions as well as response to normal operator inputs must be
verified.
Data Link and Control Transfer – At some point, and System Integration Testing is a
good time, a thorough test of the data link system is necessary. It may be unsafe or not
permissible to use the data link emitters in the laboratory environment due to hazards of
electromagnetic radiation. In this case, the time and assets must be allocated to facilitate
this critical test. Typically, a primary and back up data link are used. By attenuating the
output power of these systems and monitoring the received signal strength, it is possible
to determine whether the links will provide the range and margin determined in the
design analysis. This is an absolutely critical step, known as a “range” check and should
also be conducted in the intended flight test environment. It is also extremely important
to verify the procedures by which the secondary (or backup) data link assumes control in
the event of a primary failure. In many cases this operation is completely automatic and
requires no operator intervention or action. A more difficult form of the control transfer
may be required in which control of the air vehicle is transferred not from the primary to
back up data link, but from one ground control station to another. With less sophisticated
(low cost) systems, this may be a simple matter of shutting down the data link from one
station, while powering up the data link from the second station. However, even this
simple process has critical training and procedural impact. In most cases, the fail-safe, or
flight termination systems discussed earlier will be activated if the air vehicle receives no
data link for a specified period of time. The same is usually true if the air vehicle is
receiving two valid but conflicting data links simultaneously. Hence it becomes evident
that operator participation, or training plan development be included in this phase of
UAV/UCAV ground testing. Failed control transfers have accounted for numerous UAV
mishaps. The process is usually complicated by the fact that it almost always occurs over
a communication radio with its own inherent complications. A basic plan for the transfer
of control between two stations where the transfer is accomplished simply by switching
transmitters on or off is as follows.
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1. The receiving station declares readiness to initiate the transfer.
2. The commanding station acknowledges and declares readiness to relinquish
control.
3. The receiving station initiates the transfer by giving a “standby for transfer”
notice. He then un-keys his microphone to allow the commanding station to
interrupt the transfer if conditions warrant.
4. The receiving station then calls for “transfer in” and commences a countdown
from 3 followed by the word “transfer”.
5. On the word “transfer” the commanding station places its transmitter to OFF,
and the receiving station places its transmitter to “ON”
6. The receiving station immediately executes some maneuver (wing rock,
heading change, etc.) to verify control, and then verifies successful control
transfer over the radio.
This process may seem intuitively obvious, but failure to adhere to some disciplined form
of coordination can have dire consequences. For instance, if step six is not accomplished,
the original commanding station operator may assume the transfer has failed and respond
by turning his transmitter back on resulting in two valid links and a potential fail safe or
flight termination event.
Newer, more complex ground control stations often incorporate a more automated control
transfer mechanism, which may eliminate the need for voice communication. Typically
this will involve the air vehicle receiving a code that indicates the “address” or identity of
the controlling station. When a control transfer is requested via the data link, the air
vehicle avionics receives the request and relays it to any listening stations. If the
commanding station acknowledges and approves of the transfer (again via the data link)
the air vehicle will begin to take commands from the new station. Typically this is
accomplished in a “walking transfer” technique whereby the air vehicle first
acknowledges the back up transmitter of the new station, and then allows the transfer of
the primary up link to the new station.
The newest generation of UAV systems will allow even more flexibility as the control of
the payload or other subsystems may be transferred independently of the air vehicle
control. In some cases the air vehicle may remain in fully autonomous flight while the
control of such subsystems is transferred to the station where the data can best be
exploited. In any event, the process by which control is transferred is critical and
requires extensive scrutiny during the ground test phase.
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BIT and Auto-Test – UAV systems of all sizes are making more and better use of Built
In Testing (BIT) and Automatic Testing. These functions increase the probability that an
air vehicle brought to the flight line or launcher will, in fact, be ready for a successful
launch. In addition, these functions can reduce operator workload and allow for a
maintenance plan that reduces operational level tasking. Again, SIT is an excellent place
for these functions to be assessed, but if not done at that time, they need to be addressed
in follow on ground testing. Typically, these tests electronically check for air vehicle
response to stimuli automatically initiated at the ground control station, and for ground
control station response to stimuli injected at the air vehicle. In some cases the operator
may be required to intervene or stimulate the system on either end. These tests are
usually referred to as Inter-active tests.
In any event, the tests are only as good as the logic used to program them, and it should
not be taken for granted that they will successfully diagnose all failure modes associated
with the subsystems they are designed to test. In addition to the obvious need to verify
that the point to point flow of the stimulus to response is complete, it is highly desirable
to inject numerous faults in order to determine which, if any are missed by the test. In
some cases the BIT will simply yield a Go - No Go response. In more sophisticated
systems a specific failure mode may be diagnosed and displayed to facilitate maintenance
and trouble shooting. In general, the more sophisticated the BIT is, the more difficult it
will be to test. A thorough understanding of the capability of the BIT or auto-test, the
more likely that it will contribute to improved efficiency and ease of operation.
Power Plant – In general, UAV power plant testing is a more difficult task than similar
testing of manned aircraft. There are a number of reasons for this. First, with the
possible exception of the Medium and High Altitude/Endurance vehicles, regardless of
the type of propulsion system employed, UAV systems tend to have smaller engines or
motors. This restricts the ability of the tester to place the desired instrumentation and
monitoring equipment where it is needed. Second, due to size weight and efficiency,
many UAV systems incorporate Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS), two-stroke cycle
engines. These engines have considerably less history as aircraft power plants than fourstroke cycle engines, and hence a much smaller data base of knowledge on performance.
In addition, these engines often drive propellers that are either COTS and of inconsistent
quality, or are custom made with little supporting design data. Third, some small and
most micro UAV systems are now employing electric motors in their propulsion systems,
for which even less data is available.
While a more thorough treatment of power plant testing will be provided in the flight test
section of this document, there is still a need to address the importance of some ground
testing. In the case of prototype air vehicle, or prototype power plant testing, it is
essential to at least verify that the engine/motor is developing its full rated power, and
that the propeller is generating adequate static thrust to permit a safe takeoff. Neither of
these tasks is trivial. Fortunately, in the case of the COTS two-stroke engines, the
manufacture usually provides a specification on the rated horsepower that identifies the
type of propeller used, and the RPM produced at that rated power. These propellers are
17

usually identified by numbers indicating the diameter and pitch. It may be necessary to
ground run such engines at a lower power setting (usually attained by a fuel rich setting
of a mixture control screw) to provide the recommended break-in time for the engine.
Once this has been accomplished, it is a simple matter to install the specified propeller
and determine whether the engine will produce the rated RPM. Most Small and Tactical
UAV systems have tachometer monitoring systems, which employ Hall Effect sensors.
These are usually quite accurate. The test can also be conducted with a photo-sensing
tachometer, but these are generally less precise.
A note of caution: mixture adjustments with the engine running are hazardous, and the
smart procedure is to shut down the engine and make adjustments between runs. Even
the starting procedures (which often include an external starter manually placed against
the engine hub) should be conducted with eye, ear, and hand protection in place.
Given the inconsistent quality of many of the propellers manufactured for air vehicles in
the Micro to Tactical size, it is not at all unusual to have an engine fail to meet specified
power output, change the propeller (same make and size) and have it meet the
specification. The operational impact of this is obvious, and should be considered when
determining performance margins.
Once it has been verified that the engine is producing its rated power, it is also important
to take at least a rudimentary look at static thrust produced by the engine/propeller
combination. Again, the inconsistent characteristics of the propeller will probably
require several repetitions of the test to define the performance window even if only one
make and size of propeller is to be used. If a second make of the same size propeller is to
be approved, the testing is doubled, as the same rated pitch from different manufacturers
has proven to be entirely different, and dependent on the procedure used in design and
manufacture. The test is usually conducted with a scale or load cell and a low friction
dolly or carriage. Propeller performance models, such as the one presented in reference
(3) can be used (together with lift and drag models for the air vehicle) to determine
whether performance will be adequate to proceed with flight testing. It should be noted
that many such models may need to be adjusted to account for Reynolds number effects
due to the small size and low speed of many UAV systems.
The electric motors used by some Small and Micro UAV systems are in some ways
easier to test as power produced can be established by current and voltage monitoring. It
is important to establish that the power storage devices (batteries) are sufficient to
provide the motor(s) with sufficient power for the required flight duration. Obviously,
this needs to be done in ground testing before first flight. The issues pertaining to the
propellers used for these systems are similar to those discussed in the preceding
paragraphs.
Turbine engines for UAV systems including Micro air vehicles are becoming available.
While the gas turbine (these are typically centrifugal flow compressor designs) are better
understood and documented than the two stroke cycle engines discussed previously, the
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difficulties associated with small size remain the same. Instrumentation is more difficult,
and Full Authority Digital Engine Controls (FADEC) may or may not be available. In
general, turbine engines for use in Micro to Tactical sized vehicles are considerably less
efficient than larger engines. Endurance and range should be considered carefully before
flight. Unfortunately ground testing is often complex due to the need to account for
efficiency improvements seen at high altitudes.
Attitude and Navigation Control Ground Testing – As discussed in the introduction,
few modern UAV systems operate with direct rate controls as what was once termed
Remotely Piloted Vehicles. Attitude sensing and stabilizing systems are nearly always
employed, as well as some form of inertial or GPS navigation. While these systems will
most likely be tested during component and SIT, it is imperative that they be exercised
immediately prior to flight testing to ensure that they are operational and that their
operating sense is correct.
The attitude control system may be as elementary as a single rate gyro mounted on an
incline to sense both roll and yaw, and to provide basic wing leveling. Such a system
combined with a barometric sensor controlling altitude can provide basic autopilot and
autonomous flight functions. More often, a vertical reference gyro with a yaw rate gyro
and air data computer will be used to provide position control and autonomous
operations. Tactical and larger systems may employ redundant ring laser gyros and other
attitude computing systems. Regardless of the component architecture, some basic safety
of flight ground tests must be conducted. In cases where the design incorporates well
developed flight control laws, they can be assessed in terms of transfer functions to
ensure that the correct control surface deflections result from measured attitude
deviations. Ideally the vehicle is placed on a test stand to permit accurate attitude
measurements. This test need not be extremely complicated however, and can usually be
conducted with the vehicle on the ground. Very accurate, small, electronic angular
measurement tools are available which allow alternate zero reference selection. Two
such devices (calibrated) can be used to simultaneously measure air vehicle attitude in
one axis and one control surface deflection. In addition, a device to stimulate the pitotstatic system will be required. For a fixed wing conventional air vehicle the attitude
control system test would include some or all of the following:
1. Level the air vehicle (this may require slight nose up to account for angle of
attack in normal flight and wing incidence angle)
2. Supply appropriate input to the pitot-static system to drive the elevator to
neutral. This will vary according to the control laws for the specific air vehicle,
but typically requires providing sufficient pitot pressure to match the airspeed
report to the airspeed commanded in the GCS.
3. Raise the nose 5 degrees and check for elevator deflection trailing edge down.
The amount of travel can be verified if control laws are known. Verify GCS
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attitude display is in agreement. Repeat in 5-degree increments until maximum
allowable elevator travel is reached.
4. Lower the nose 5 degrees and check for elevator deflection trailing edge up.
The amount of travel can be verified if control laws are known. Verify GCS
attitude display is in agreement. Repeat in 5 degree increments until maximum
allowable elevator travel is reached.
5. Roll the air vehicle 5 degrees right and check for left aileron deflection, trailing
edge up. The amount of travel can be verified if control laws are known. Verify
GCS attitude display is in agreement. Repeat in 5 degree increments until
maximum allowable aileron travel is reached.
6. Roll the air vehicle 5 degrees left and check for left aileron deflection, trailing
edge down. The amount of travel can be verified if control laws are known.
Verify GCS attitude display is in agreement. Repeat in 5 degree increments
until maximum allowable aileron travel is reached.
7. While moving the air vehicle nose left, observe yaw rate display for correct
direction, and rudder (if yaw or Dutch Roll damping is implemented) for
deflection right.
The airspeed and altitude deviation response should also be checked. These will be
dependent on control law implementation. In many cases, the altitude sensing system
(usually static pressure, or radar) will drive the throttle actuator, and the airspeed system
will drive elevator. Again, by inducing a difference between commanded and reported
altitude and airspeed, the correct operating sense of the elevator and throttle can be
verified (elevator down for low reported airspeed, and throttle increase for low reported
altitude). With fully defined control laws, the quantitative response can also be verified.
These systems will in many cases have some interaction such as long term integrators if
the difference between commanded and reported data exists for an extended period.
Even without any quantitative data on control laws, these simple steps can help to ensure
that the first attempt at launch or takeoff will lead to a productive data collection flight,
and not a disaster. More complex air vehicle arrangements, such as V-Tails, and flying
wing planforms with elevon control can also be handled in similar fashion with a basic
understanding of the control surface design. Even rotary wing air vehicles can be
assessed in this fashion by measuring cyclic pitch, collective pitch, tail rotor, and power
responses.
Similarly, the outer loop navigation functions need to be verified as safe for flight prior to
developmental flight testing. In setting up for this ground test, a few critical steps must
be taken. The GCS map display (if implemented), the air vehicle avionics, and any truth
data (GPS etc.) must all be speaking the same language. This means ensuring that these
systems are all operating in the same coordinate system (UTM Grid, Lat/Lon, etc.), as
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well as using the same mapping datum (NAD 27, WGS 84, etc.). Failure to verify these
parameters will result in poor quantitative accuracy data at best, and may result in
completely incorrect response to navigation commands.
Once these parameters are verified, it is possible to do some very simple ground tests to
gain a significant degree of confidence in how the air vehicle will respond in flight to
navigation inputs. The air vehicle can be placed on a given heading, and commanded to
proceed to a waypoint to its right. The expected response for a conventional, fixed wing
air vehicle is to see some right aileron deflection, trailing edge up. Knowledge of the
control laws permits measurement of the surface deflection for various angles of the air
vehicle relative to the commanded waypoint. This may be accomplished either by
changing the waypoint, or rotating the air vehicle. Typically the controls will respond
with increasing control surface deflection up to some maximum allowable angle as the
heading difference is increased. Aileron deflection should be zero for waypoints on the
air vehicle heading, providing the air vehicle is level, and way points to the left should
result in similar left aileron deflection. Again, even without well-defined control laws
to verify, this simple test can assess correct operating sense, and give the testers a
qualitative feel for whether an appropriate amount of control surface deflection is
induced. Any mixing of rudder deflection in this test should generally be in the same
sense (coordinated turn) as the aileron deflection.
One additional and highly advisable ground test for the navigation system is to verify that
the system correctly identifies that the air vehicle has arrived at a designated waypoint
and executes the next step in the navigation program. If the system cannot adequately
simulate this step, it can usually be accomplished by towing the air vehicle or placing it
on a ground vehicle depending on its size. It is valuable, but not required, to know what
the navigation software assigns as the “arrival circle” or distance from the waypoint at
which it assumes it has reached the point. Convenient waypoints can then be
programmed to allow the vehicle to be driven to within this radius and observed for
response. The GCS displays should indicate that the waypoint has been reached, and
what the new destination is. The air vehicle should respond with control surface
deflection to initiate a turn toward the new point. It should also indicate altitude and
airspeed response consistent with the programmed parameters. Response should be
verified with new waypoints to the right and left of the air vehicle heading. Finally this
test should be done while arriving at the last waypoint programmed. This step will verify
the response of the air vehicle when the programmed mission is complete. It may be
designed to return to base, continue on current heading, revert to some operatorcontrolled mode, or repeat the program. Control surface response should be verified, as
well as some positive form of operator notification that the program has been completed.
Like the attitude control system ground checks, these simple steps can also be conducted
on more complex air vehicle arrangements as well as rotary wing vehicles, providing the
basic control response is adequately understood. If it is not, then flight testing should
probably not be attempted in any event.
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In general, it is possible to take a low cost system, about which little documentation is
available and gain a reasonable level of confidence in the attitude and navigation control
systems with some basic, inexpensive ground testing. More complex systems with welldefined control laws can benefit even more, as flight control algorithms can be verified
during the process.
Electro-Magnetic Effects – Electro-Magnetic Interference, Vulnerability, and
Compatibility testing have become increasingly important in manned aircraft with the
advent of digital flight control systems. It is intuitively obvious that with respect to UAV
systems, this issue is a primary concern and must be examined very carefully. This is due
to the fact that UAV systems rely on Radio Frequency (RF) transmissions for all operator
control inputs, and all operator displays. There are no “steam gauge” or mechanical back
up systems when the air vehicle may be many miles from the operator. UAV systems
require attention to these issues in the design phase, and appropriate shielding/protection
of components, actuators, wiring harnesses, and antenna cables must be built in.
Furthermore, a system that is intended to go into operational use should be extensively
tested in the intended operational environment. This is usually accomplished by defining
that environment, and reproducing it in a controlled or “shielded facility.” This facility
must be capable of producing the desired frequencies of radiated energy, at the
appropriate energy levels. For example, a system intended for ship-board use must be
able to function in an environment that includes close range emissions from surface and
air traffic radar systems, communications equipment, and weapons systems. Failure to
do so will require that variations to normal procedures be developed, such as emissions
control during UAV operations. In other words, specific systems that cause problems for
the UAV must not be operated during UAV operations. This situation is not desirable
and can greatly reduce the effectiveness and benefit of the UAV system.
In addition to these outside sources or inter-system compatibility issues, UAV systems
may also suffer from intra-system compatibility problems. In such cases, the problem is
often related to a specific avionics or data link component, which injects RF noise into
the wiring harness. The noise may then enter the data link receiver and effectively raise
the noise floor, increasing the signal to noise ratio required to get a valid message
received. This will reduce the effective range of the data link and may even render it
unusable. It is possible for components as elementary as an updated component with a
new clock oscillator to induce this failure mode. This is one of several reasons for the
emphasis on configuration control discussed in the risk reduction section of this
document. The range, or attenuated signal test discussed in the data link ground test
section of this document is an effective mitigation technique, providing the configuration
and environment are considered.
A more thorough, but still basic EMC test should be considered mandatory before any
first flight or following any configuration change. The U. S. Navy policy for this test on
manned aircraft is defined in the NAVAIR Instruction 3960.4A, reference (4). The
procedure is called an EMC Safety Of Flight Test (SOFT). It is essentially an intra22

systems test, but if conducted in the environment of the intended flight (same airfield or
range) it also provides a level of comfort for system performance against any active
emitters in the area. For UAV systems this test requires that all subsystems intended to
be used during the flight be on and operating. This should include all data links,
instrumentation, and communications radios. It also requires that the air vehicle engine
be running at several different RPM settings to account for ignition system noise. If the
air vehicle is equipped with a generator or alternator, it must be on and operating, with
any ground power or links disconnected.
The test technique requires a test engineer (with appropriate training and safety
equipment) to apply manual pressure to the control surfaces as standard control check is
conducted by the pilot/operator. This process is repeated for as many different data links,
transmitter powers settings, antenna types, and engine speeds as listed in the EMC SOFT
plan. The engineer is looking for any uncommanded control surface fluctuations. In
addition, an electrical actuator or servo, which shows a marked decrease in centering or
positioning force is often, an indication of electrical noise transmitted to the device via
the signal wire. This is sometimes manifested visually by the control surface
overshooting the commanded position and oscillating in a lightly damped, second order
system motion before assuming the commanded position. These are positive indications
of an EMC problem, and flight should not be attempted until the problem is identified
and remedied.
While the control surfaces are being checked, the ground control station displays are
monitored for any abnormal indications, alerts, cautions, or warnings. Data link signal
strength and loss of signal warnings are given extra attention. A radio frequency
spectrum analyzer may also be employed during this test to ensure that all intended
emitters are operating and to aid in troubleshooting if problems are encountered.
Installation of additional shielding, ferrite beads, torroid coils, or other filtering are
typical corrective actions once a noise source has been identified.
The EMC SOFT is planned by associating all of the flight critical systems in a sourcevictim matrix. This matrix is then used to generate a test procedure that is designed to
help isolate both the source of the electro-magnetic interference, and the system being
impacted (victim). An EMC SOFT source/victim matrix from the Naval Air Warfare
Center-Aircraft Division, Strike Test Directorate test plan for the BQM-147A Nuc/Met
payload test is presented in Table 4. A typical EMC SOFT test procedure for a tactical
sized UAV (Pioneer) is also presented as Appendix A.
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Table 4
EMC SOFT SOURCE VICTIM MATRIX
SOURCE →
VICTIM ↓
Primary &
Secondary
Uplink (all
modes)
Downlink
(all modes)
UMAS and
Servos
Airborne
Video
System

Airborne
Video
System
X

UMAS and
Servos

X

X

X

X
X

Downlink
(all
modes)
X

Primary &
Secondary
Uplink

Nuc/Met
Payload
X

* Quadra
Ignition
System
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

*Engine running.

Weight and Balance – This issue is obviously not UAV unique, but is just as critical for
longitudinal static stability as with manned aircraft. In the case of smaller air vehicles, it
becomes even easier to verify, as the vehicle can typically be “hung” to verify the Center
of Gravity (CG) position. It is even more critical with flying wing vehicles as the stable
range tends to be small.
An additional note is necessary here if the system is intended to use a Rocket Assisted
Take Off (RATO) booster, as many UAV systems do. It is essential with these systems
that the air vehicle be hung for all three axes, and the CG location be accurately located
vertically. If not precisely matched to the design position, the forces generated by the
rocket booster can easily overcome the aerodynamic forces generated by the flight
controls with catastrophic results. Missing by an inch can result in the loss of the air
vehicle during launch.
In, summary, regardless of system size and complexity, a finite set of critical ground tests
will go a long way to ensure a safe and successful flight test event. These tests need not
be complex or time consuming and can be set up and conducted without major schedule
impact. A qualitative look at power plant, data links, attitude and navigation control,
Electro-Magnetic Compatibility issues, and weight and balance is imperative to reduce
the risk of any first flight, or flight following a configuration change.
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CHAPTER 3
FLIGHT TESTING
Here we begin the discussion of actual UAV/UCAV flight test operations, and the unique
challenges that are inherent in testing these systems. Reference will continue to be made
to the introductory material to distinguish UAV classification, control modes, and
operating scheme.
Pilots or Operators – One can begin a heated political and philosophical discussion in
some military or civil circles simply by referring to the individual controlling a UAV as a
pilot! We will avoid this issue as it does little to add to the technical knowledge base for
UAV flight testing. It is conceivable, however, that the men controlling shipping traffic
into large ports just after the turn of the century had similar reservations about the term
pilot being applied to the people experimenting with fragile flying machines.
Methods of Control - Regardless of the term used to identify the person (both pilot and
operator will be used here), it is extremely important to look at how the task is completed
and how the individual acquires the knowledge and skills required to do so. This topic
once again leads us to the issues of UAV classification and flight control modes. As
discussed in the introduction, two primary methods employed (particularly for Micro to
Tactical sized systems), internal and external operator control.
In external operations, the pilot controls the air vehicle while visually observing the
vehicle itself and using this sight picture to interpret and control attitude and flight path.
By contrast, internal operations are conducted from inside the ground control station, by
reference to telemetered data and/or real time video. The data is typically displayed as
computer generated symbology similar to Electronic Flight Information Systems (EFIS)
in manned aircraft. Current trends in UAV system development are towards decreased
use of external pilots. In fact, the trend for operational systems is toward more
automation, and fewer control requirements for the internal pilot as well. The following
points as well as some opposing points are often used for justifying this trend:
1. Increased time is required to train pilots to interpret and control attitude and flight
path from visual cues as an external pilot.
2. An external pilot is required for downrange operations introducing the redundancy
of requiring both types of pilots since the external pilot obviously can’t be used for this..
3. Historically higher mishap rates have been noted during external operations of
systems that use external pilots for launch and recovery.
4. There is a need for additional GCS equipment (external flight control boxes etc.).
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These points are, in general, valid for operational UAV systems. However, the point can
also be made that for developmental testing of Micro to Tactical size UAV systems the
external pilot can be a very valuable asset. Considering these points in sequence:
1. This statement is true. Anecdotal evidence indicates that taking a group of twelve
individuals with no training or experience and putting them through a syllabus typically
produces up to six qualified internal pilots, but probably no more than two external pilots.
However, it is also certainly true that training a test pilot takes considerably more time
and effort, and has a higher failure rate than training an operational pilot.
2. This statement assumes there is no value added by this second form of operation.
Again, probably true for operations, but not necessarily for flight testing.
3. There are several reasons for this trend. Typically, systems employing an external
pilot (such as the U.S. Navy Pioneer) use him primarily for the high pilot work load tasks
of takeoff and landing, or launch and recovery. Considering night operations are routine
and recovery into a net on a moving (not to mention pitching, heaving and rolling) ship, it
is not hard to understand this trend.
4. This can generally be overcome for developmental testing by interfacing a COTS
control box with the ground data link terminal.
Qualifications - Some additional historical background is also in order here. As UAV
development and testing has progressed for the past two decades, both government and
contractors have typically recruited external pilots from the ranks of the model aviation
community. This is a logical course of action, because the skills required to control the
air vehicle from the external perspective have already been developed in these
individuals. These skills are usually developed with aircraft that operate exclusively in
the rate control mode, with no stability augmentation. Therefore, these pilots have the
ability to recover air vehicles (assuming reasonable static stability) even in the case of
autopilot or other catastrophic failures by reverting to direct rate control of the flight
control surfaces. This is not typically the case for internal pilots.
The problem is that these skills are necessary, but not sufficient for UAV flight test
operations. The missing knowledge and skills required for flight-testing must be
developed by additional training and experience. Furthermore, it may not be possible to
develop these skills in all candidates. The primary requirement is system knowledge.
The average aero-modeler does not need to know and understand the myriad of
subsystems and reversionary modes available on most UAV systems. This is absolutely
imperative for flight test operations. In addition, an engineering background is
essentially mandatory. The pilot must understand the data being collected if he is to
perform the test in an efficient manner. Finally, the pilot’s training must develop the
flight test discipline that all flight test programs require. Go/No-Go decision making,
proper briefing, and test coordination must all be included in the external test pilot’s
training.
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Similarly, internal pilots or operators need to have the training and experience to maintain
a very high state of situational awareness. Operational employment varies between
countries and even individual services. U. S. Navy UAV pilots are generally enlisted
ranks, while the Air Force typically uses rated flying officers. Status, class, and rank are
of little impact, but training and experience are even more critical for flight test than for
operational employment. Again, training or experience in an engineering discipline, or
even graduation from a test pilot school, are highly desirable, even required traits.
For both internal and external pilots, a training, qualification, and currency plan should be
employed. As with manned aviation, the essential skills deteriorate with lack of use. Air
Traffic Control (ATC) coordination, weather, and Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT)
are typical of manned aircraft training subjects that should be included in the UAV test
pilot training syllabus.
Feedback - A fundamental and unique aspect of UAV operation is the complete lack of
the multitude of subtle cue provided to the pilot of a manned aircraft. Wind noise, engine
vibration, peripheral cues, and feel of acceleration on the human body are all missing for
the UAV pilot. The safe operation of a UAV requires intense concentration on
exclusively visual feedback (audio systems are now being implemented on some
systems). The ability of the human brain and vision system to adapt and manage this
environment should be the subject of another entire paper! A frequent topic of discussion
among UAV pilots is how two different air vehicles, or two different flight envelopes can
“feel” completely different, despite being controlled by the same pilot interface, with the
same or no, force feedback. This phenomenon appears to be entirely a learned effect,
based on visual cues and knowledge of the vehicle or conditions. While much of this
discussion is based on experience with small or tactical sized UAV systems, similar
comments can be seen in technical reports and literature such as reference (5), the subject
of which is the X-36 high performance sub-scale air vehicle.
Command and Control – Command and control constitutes the single largest difference
in UAV flight testing as compared to manned aircraft testing. It can be generalized that
most UAV systems contain at least four basic command and control components.
1. The Ground Control Station, or GCS. This may or may not be contained within a
shelter or container. It is the focal point from which all operator commands are sent, and
all air vehicle reports are displayed. Emphasis will be placed on the operator interface
and its relation to concepts of operation.
2. The Ground Data Terminal, or GDT. This component generally contains the radio
link ground based transmitter(s), and receiver(s). As discussed earlier, it is normal for
most UAV systems to have at least two data links for redundancy. In addition to this
primary and backup link architecture, the links are bi-directional and usually referred to
in terms of the Up Link, or command link, and the Down Link, which may also be
referred to as the telemetry link. Many systems also incorporate a third data link, which
is also technically a down link, but is used exclusively to carry the payload video or other
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sensor data. Other systems have the telemetry data imbedded on the same link. Some
systems also now incorporate satellite data links.
3. The Air Data Terminal or ADT provides the same function but is located in the air
vehicle. For this reason, it must obviously be smaller, consume less power, and be of
lighter weight. It has direct and indirect interfaces with the flight control computers.
4. The antenna systems are connected to the GDT and ADT via hardwire or fiberoptic cable. These systems can range from simple dipole omni-directional radiators, to
state of the art, high gain arrays. Directional systems may be steered via GPS data
provided by the GDT and GCS, signal strength tracking, or manual tracking.
Ground Control Station - Again, the types of systems employed and concept of
operations are extremely varied, and will be addressed in general terms according to
historical precedent and current trends.
The most basic command and control operator interface employed in the developmental
testing of small and even tactical UAV systems, like the first generation of pilots, was
adopted from the model aviation community. High-end, COTS radio control systems and
components have been adapted for use on numerous UAV systems. These systems offer
an extremely low cost way to facilitate human interface with command and control and
incorporate excellent reliability with a wide range of very useful features. The use of
these COTS systems as they exist is extremely risky and in most cases illegal. The
transmitters used in most such system operate on frequencies that are established for
aero-modeling (72 Mega-Hertz in the United States, and are generally not approved for
government use. In addition, the power output from the transmitters is typically on the
order of 300 milliwatts, which is insufficient for flight beyond visual range. Boosting
this signal with RF amplifiers is again unwise, and not legal. The command and control
link for any UAV must be on a frequency, and of a bandwidth approved by the frequency
coordination authority. Use of these civil frequencies not only subjects the UAV
command link to potential interference, but boosting the signal has liability issues for
damage to privately owned model aircraft over a large area.
This is not to say that these components can not be used. In fact, many small UAV
projects have successfully used the COTS interface and saved substantial investments in
engineering and design. The RF section of many of the PCM transmitters is modular and
can be removed. Similarly, with the receiver crystal oscillator removed, the receiver
decoder can be employed in the air vehicle. The serial data from the control box can then
be fed into an appropriate, approved data link transmitter. The data link receiver in the
air vehicle can then feed the data into the COTS receiver for decoding and it may even be
used for driving COTS servos.
Several words of caution are appropriate here. In addition to disabling any RF functions
in the COTS transmitter and receiver, it is important to provide power to the servos from
a clean regulated power supply or battery. Voltage drops at the COTS receiver may
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activate built in warning systems, which may have adverse impacts on the flight control
system. Another consideration is that these COTS control boxes have become extremely
sophisticated as micro-processor technology has "computerized” the radio control
systems. A thorough understanding of the functionality, which varies with manufacturer
and model, is critical. Switches that can reverse servo direction, change gain, or mix
channels are typical. Inadvertent operation of these functions can be disastrous.
As UAV systems increase in cost and complexity, custom designed pilot interface
controls are more likely to be employed. Many systems are now being designed to use
Human Computer Interface (HCI) displays and controls with no pilot box or joystick
hardware. This type of interface is generally used with air vehicles implementing
primarily autonomous flight modes, with the operator supplying “outer loop” inputs
through the HCI.
Thorough GCS testing is, in general, a fairly laborious task. During the System
Integration Test phase, individual messages to and from the GCS must be verified. The
Ground tests discussed previously can be used to verify most of the flight critical
functionality. Additional testing must include a human factors assessment. The issues
that need to be addressed are:
1. Is flight critical data displayed in easily readable locations and easily interpreted
displays?
2. Is the interface for pilot input (joystick, control box, mouse, etc.) intuitive to
operate, and responsive?
3. Is the situational awareness provided by navigation and attitude displays, including
map displays if implemented, adequate for precise positioning of the air vehicle with
respect to the mission requirement?
4. Are appropriate cautions, warnings, and alerts displayed and do they support rapid
completion of the emergency procedures they are designed to trigger?
5. System latency will be discussed further, and is typically more likely to be
generated by the data link than the GCS, but if it is suspected to be a problem, it should
be measured through the GCS to help identify the major contributing subsystems.
6. Finally, some assessment of pilot/operator workload should be conducted for both
normal and emergency procedures.
Cooper-Harper handling qualities, Bedford
workload, or some similar structured analysis should be employed for this assessment.
Appendix B presents two Cooper-Harper formats, and Appendix C provides the Bedford
Workload Diagram.
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Most Ground Control Stations incorporate a second workstation or “Bay” which is used
by a payload operator. The tests described for the pilot’s controls and displays are “in
general” appropriate for the payload controls and displays as well.
Ground Data Terminal – The testing of the ground data terminal is normally a
straightforward process. Message traffic into the terminal usually follows a well-defined
format. It is often an industry standard format such as RS-422. The verification of the
data traffic may require some test equipment to decode and display the messages. These
tests can be complicated by contractor proprietary data formats, so it is advisable to
include contractor support during ground and/or SIT testing to decode and assess the data
in such cases.
Transmitter and encoder/decoder testing can also be accomplished with basic radiocommunications test equipment. Receiver sensitivity, transmitter power output, and
spectrum analysis for on-frequency transmission are typical tests. The test results should
be compared to design analysis of the GDT performance.
Air Data Terminal – Air data terminal testing is essentially similar to the GDT testing
described above. Decoding and interface with the flight control system may require
additional attention.
Antenna Systems – Antenna system testing is also straightforward in most cases. The
complexity of the system may vary, but essentially the frequency and power radiated, and
the reflected power should be assessed. Some systems may provide automatic testing and
display of this data. Obviously, satellite communications systems will have their own
test and validation requirements.
Directional antenna systems may be steered by components that are part of the antenna
system, and may also rely on some GDT components. Range and azimuth calibration
tests are generally required if the system tracks on signal strength. GPS steered systems
can be tested by varying the AV position or GDT position inputs and observing the
response. If omni-directional back up systems are used, the switching between the two
systems should also be tested.
Operational employment frequently calls for the antenna system to be placed a
considerable distance from the GCS for obvious tactical reasons. Typically 400 to 500
meters of separation is provided. If the communication line to the antenna system is hard
wired, the system should be tested to verify sufficient signal drive to overcome the line
impedance. If fiber-optic cable is used, it should be assessed for resistance to damage by
foot traffic or other expected disturbances, to ensure operational suitability.
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Latency – As automation and computerization of UAV systems increases, assessment of
end-to-end system latency becomes very critical. As mentioned before, satellite data
links now employed by some systems have raised this issue to an even higher level. The
round trip time for these links can exceed several seconds. Additionally, the use of Local
Area Networks, and wireless networks within the command and controls systems can add
additional delays dependent on switching and request traffic. The benefit to such systems
is the ability to distribute information and control to where it can most effectively be
employed. Obviously, the impact of latency on air vehicle operation is directly related to
the degree of automation, or the requirement for direct control.
Surprisingly, preliminary results from tests at the Naval Air Warfare Center Manned
Flight Simulator as, presented in reference (6), indicate that using direct, stick control
(position and rate modes) UAV pilots were able to adapt well to increased latency. Both
internal and external pilots performed tasks such as accurate landing with latencies that
would be unacceptable in manned aircraft. This data is not conclusive, and the trend is
toward using automated launch and recovery systems with the operator essentially
handling “outer loop” control assignments to the air vehicle autopilot during flight.
When testing systems with high latency, another consideration is payload utility. The
classic UAV task of surveillance may require manual manipulation of camera pointing.
Can the operator locate and point at the target without numerous overshoots due to the
delay between the camera direction and the displayed video? This too, may be dealt with
by employing automation such as point to coordinate, auto search, and auto track. These
functions must be tested to ensure operational suitability, and to assess operator
workload. Similarly, UCAV brings the issue of weapons systems control. The system
must be tested to determine if weapon release authority can be safely determined and
executed with delays in the indication of target status.
The trend toward increased air vehicle autonomy has many potential pitfalls for the tester.
In addition to isolating the pilot from air vehicle response in a general sense, it can
prevent corrective action during flight-safety critical events. The desire for increased
autonomy is understandable and certainly achievable for operational systems. However,
in the flight test environment it is this author’s opinion that reversionary flight control
modes, up to and including direct rate control in some cases, are highly desirable.
Several large UAV system mishaps and many smaller ones, which have occurred during
developmental test flights, almost certainly could have been avoided by such
reversionary, or panic modes. It falls back to the need for highly trained and experienced
UAV test pilots/operators to make use of these capabilities. Large sophisticated UAV
and UCAV systems are typically very software intensive and highly automated. In many
development programs, the software code generation is spread over a large number of
very competent and highly skilled programmers. It is not uncommon, despite the best
systems engineering processes to have issues with the integrated package during flight
testing. Furthermore, the flight test environment is not well understood by those on the
outside, and is frequently not adequately considered as the code is developed based on
operational requirements. At some point, the desire to reduce the flying skills required by
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the operator of the system in the field, leads to automation, which essentially relegates the
flight test team (including the pilot) to the status of spectators during the flight. This
situation should be considered during the risk mitigation steps discussed previously. If it
is possible for a flight mode to fail, which leaves no option for the pilot other than flight
termination, then modification of the system for flight testing should be considered.
Flight control modes, such as emergency modes, that can not be exited once entered
should raise a warning flag. Modifications to system hardware and software to facilitate
the extra control modes can be removed once suitable maturity and system safety have
been demonstrated. If they are never actually needed then the cost of the program may
have been slightly inflated, but if they are needed and work just once, they may save the
entire program.
Instrumentation – UAV system testing presents both unique challenges and
opportunities in the area of flight test instrumentation. In the case on Micro to Tactical
sized systems, the combined limitations of payload size and data link bandwidth may
preclude the addition of any new downlinked data parameters. On the other hand, many
such systems already pass a multitude of data, which can be picked up at the GDT using a
Personal Computer (PC) to record the data. The data can often be played back via the
GCS or the PC and displayed for analysis. In addition, it may be possible to display
critical parameters real time during high-risk flight tests to facilitate monitoring by flight
test engineers.
In cases where the data required is not available on the data link, or truth data is required,
but the air vehicle can not support the installation of additional instrumentation, several
innovative approaches have been developed. Live video down links, intended for
payload or pilot’s view have been used to bring down data either by encoding on the
video or audio channels, or by pointing the camera at small data displays or instruments
on the air vehicle. This technique has included placing small compass in the corner of
the camera field of view, and adding attitude reference lines to the video display monitor.
A method for facilitating navigation system performance data in situations where there is
no payload available to install a radar-tracking beacon, or the beacon presents an ElectroMagnetic Interference hazard, chaff has been used to supplement the radar signature. By
spreading chaff of the appropriate length for the radar frequency band thinly on wide
pieces of tape, and placing the tape flush on the exterior of the air vehicle, solid radar
“skin paint” tracks can be generated. This procedure requires a range radar system of
sufficient accuracy and resolution to provide accurate truth data from the track.
If instrumentation, telemetry transmitters, and/or radar beacons are installed for testing, it
is imperative that they be installed and operating during the previously described EMC
Safety of Flight Test.
Air Vehicle Flying Qualities – Flying qualities represents another unique aspect of
UAV/UCAV flight testing. At first glance, there would appear to be little logic in even
addressing the issue. Considering traditional measurements, such as stick force per g,
seems to have little value. If the pilot has a stick at all, it will have the same force at 600
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knots and 10 g’s as it has with the air vehicle in the hangar! Specifically it will be equal
to a spring constant times the amount of stick deflection. Yet, as mentioned in the
previous discussion on pilots/operators, it is a fact that there is a discernable difference in
most cases between the “feel” of an air vehicle that is stable and controllable and one,
which behaves poorly in either respect. This is especially true of systems with rate
control, but can be discernable even in less direct control modes. This is not to say that
flying qualities testing is always necessary, or even appropriate. If the system is
essentially autonomous, with little direct operator input other than altitude, airspeed and
heading commands submitted with a mouse click, then there is probably little to be
gained. If the reversionary modes discussed in the previous section are incorporated and
require rate control by the pilot, they should be evaluated to ensure adequate flying
qualities. This may actually be done via simulator if the simulation is of sufficient
quality, and the flight test poses high risk.
In the case of a UAV with a rate control mode, and stick control (pilot control box) some
interesting techniques have been employed. The BQM-147A is a small delta wing UAV.
During testing for a jammer payload mission, a flying qualities assessment was
conducted. As detailed in reference (7), the payload limit was insufficient for
instrumentation, but the side area of the upper fixed, and lower retractable antennae
warranted an assessment of the flying qualities impact. By carefully calibrating the
incidence angles of the forward-looking video camera, and applying a measured angular
overlay to the video monitor, the horizon and fixed ground references were used to
quantify pitch, roll, and yaw excursions. Using basic manned aircraft flying qualities
techniques, the longitudinal and lateral-directional characteristics of the system were
analyzed. The resulting data were in direct agreement with the qualitative assessment of
several pilots familiar with the handling qualities of the air vehicle. Selected tables,
figures and results from the reference technical report are included as appendix D.
At the other end of the spectrum, several large UAV systems have been successful using
alternative acquisition strategies, which essentially only test the system mission
capabilities. These are highly automated vehicles and control stations with satellite links.
Any test of the flying qualities of this type of system, would essentially be a test of the
autopilot algorithm response to operator requests for changes to the flight path.
Air Vehicle Performance – Like flying qualities, there is a large variation in the need for
and utility of performance data collection. In all cases, the system will have specific
performance requirements and specifications. In many cases however, the performance
being measured is that of the system and may have little to do with the capability of the
air vehicle-power plant combination. For instance, if the specification is for the system to
be capable of achieving a 1,000 foot per minute climb rate under given atmospheric
conditions, it is a simple matter to request an altitude change at the GCS and determine if
the vehicle achieves and maintains the specified climb rate. The traditional methods,
such as saw-tooth climbs and level accelerations would be of little use, because the
system would limit the performance to the value programmed for conditions. For
instance, if maximum airspeed is commanded from some much lower speed, the system
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is likely to use only 80 percent of rated horsepower or thrust, and then roll that in via an
integrator circuit or algorithm over 5 or 10 second period. Thus, the acceleration is not
what the vehicle can perform, but what the autopilot/GCS will allow.
Critical performance issues for UAV systems in traditional missions are more likely to be
parameters like range, endurance, and time on station for a given profile. Testing for
these specifications is fairly straight-forward. One parameter that should be assessed in
detail is takeoff or launch performance. It is very important to collect sufficient data to
accurately assess system performance at high density altitudes. Even autonomous launch
modes will normally use maximum available power or thrust for takeoff, so if
performance is anemic under normal conditions, the impact on operational performance
in adverse conditions like high, hot and humid locations should be analyzed and reported.
The advent of UCAV systems with air-to-air capability will undoubtedly change this
approach to air vehicle performance testing. In an environment where maximum
sustained and instantaneous turn rates, speed, and acceleration are critical, these
parameters will have to be tested, and the envelope expanded to its maximum potential.
This may be conducted with man-in-the-loop, or by “canned” maneuvers.
One advantage of UAV systems for both flying qualities and performance testing is the
ability to inject precise maneuver commands from the ground control station. This
technique has also been used for recovery system integration, where pitch frequency
sweeps of specific magnitude and frequency were required for response analysis. The air
vehicle response can be captured by the same PC injecting the commands, which
facilitates an automated analysis and fast turn around.
System Flight Testing – The bulk of UAV systems flight testing, beyond the subjects
already addressed, involves payload testing. The variety of payloads employed on UAV
systems continues to grow and is beyond the scope of this document. Some of the most
common payload types will be addressed here.
Electro-Optical (EO)/Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR) – Essentially a daylight TV
and night vision FLIR combination, this is by far the most common UAV payload. Used
for a variety of missions including surveillance, reconnaissance, battle damage, and
targeting, these payloads have demonstrated significant operational utility. In some
cases, the FLIR payload and the daylight TV payload may be separate units carried
interchangeably, but not together. In either case, the testing is quite similar with respect
to the payload capability with the exception of the resolution test methods. For the FLIR,
the resolution is tested and analyzed the same way that it would be done on a manned
aircraft. The minimum resolvable temperature difference and spatial frequency
resolution are measured under various conditions as detailed in reference (8), the United
States Naval Test Pilot School Systems Flight Test Manual 109. Daylight television
resolution testing should also be conducted in a dynamic (in flight) environment, using
resolution grids.
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More typically and somewhat unique to UAV testing, is the need to verify the overall
accuracy of the system. A series of assessments is necessary here if the intent is to
improve targeting accuracy.
1. First, the navigation accuracy of the UAV must be precise because it is typically
the basis for the remaining targeting calculations. Earlier UAV systems relied
primarily on GDT tracking in range and azimuth for air vehicle location. These
systems require a very accurate survey of the GDT location to provide reasonable
accuracy. Newer systems generally use P-Code GPS data or differential GPS for
air vehicle position data.
2. Next, the air vehicle altitude, attitude and heading must be precisely resolved.
Typically this needs to be better than one tenth of a degree in all three axes for
good results. Some payloads may provide this data independently, but that is
typically not the case. GPS altitude is typically not sufficient for good results due
to satellite geometry with respect to the vertical axis.
3. The payload pointing angles relative to the air vehicle must now be resolved with
a high degree of accuracy.
4. Finally, the target altitude must be supplied. This can be done by comparing the
target location to a terrain elevation database, or by providing slant range via laser
or other range finding device.
In addition to accuracy, the update rate of these data to the targeting computer (which
may be air or ground based) must be sufficient relative to air vehicle speed. A 1 Hertz
update at 120 knots can yield a 200-foot (approximately 66-meter) error in the base
calculation.
Communications Relay – Communications relay payloads are frequently employed to
provide extended range, or over the horizon data transmission from other systems. Flight
testing of these systems requires special attention to frequency coordination and EMC
issues. Typically, integration of these payloads will require additional shielding, and/or
employment of band pass filtering. It is important to test the UAV system on all
available command and control frequencies. Most UAV systems have at least some
frequency agility, and failure to test all combinations of up and down link frequencies can
result in major problems in operational employment.
Jammers – Jamming payloads are employed to deprive adversaries of normal
communication and data transmission channels. Obviously, all of the comments listed in
the previous paragraph apply to jammer payloads to an even greater degree. Intra-system
effects such as the jammer signal entering the wiring harness and disrupting air vehicle
sensors is not unusual. Testing of these systems, once successfully integrated, is usually
centered on the effectiveness of the payload against the intended victim sources. This
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will often involve flying specific profiles at various ranges to document effects of range
and attitude on effectiveness.
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Detectors (NBC) – These sensors can vary from very
small (less than 1 pound) units that must be visually checked, up to 40 pound systems
which can down link specific data on agent types and concentrations. Developmental
testing is usually starts centered on integration with existing telemetry streams, or
addition of payload specific links. The systems must then be tested for functionality that
often involves the use of agent simulants to trigger detection. Some detectors will require
flight profiles that place the air vehicle in the simulant cloud, while others can detect
from stand off positions. In the case of nuclear or radiological testing, RF emissions are
generally used to simulate the field, and the air vehicle/payload are used to map the
concentrations. Attention to hazardous materials safety is critical during the planning and
execution of the flight testing of these systems.
Emulation – Emulation packages may be used to “spoof” sensors into identifying the
UAV as another aircraft or even surface vehicle. It is possible for these systems to be
essentially passive, existing essentially of various energy reflectors. More often, they
will have RF emitters as well, and require attention to EMC issues as with the relay and
jammer packages described above. Flight test profiles will also most likely require
illumination with various threat detection systems to quantify the effectiveness of the
payload.
Lethal Payloads – Integration of lethal payloads is an obvious requirement for UCAV
systems. Air-to-Air, and Air-to-Ground weapons may be integrated and tested. Classic
manned aircraft approaches to weapon separation and weapon system testing will be
required. In addition, the issue of weapon release consent must be considered. If the
system is largely autonomous, or has large latency, the employment of the weapon may
have to be automatic. This is not all that dissimilar from cruise and standoff weapon
testing. It will be critical for the UAV and weapons test communities to work closely and
exchange test technique information to conduct safe and effective testing of these
systems.
Launch and Recovery Systems – Many Tactical and smaller UAV systems incorporate
zero-length or short takeoff assist launching systems. These systems require attention to
structural issues and may require additional ground testing to verify both, structural
integrity, and avionics survivability in this harsh environment. Longitudinal load factors
up to 25g are not unusual. The issue of pilot intervention during initial flight testing is
also an important consideration. By definition, the air vehicle will be at low altitude and
airspeed during the test, and reaction to any anomaly must be swift and correct. Initial
tests from elevated positions may be desirable to improve the available response time.
As mentioned earlier, the relationship of the air vehicle center-of-gravity (in all axes) to
that of the launch system must be accurately established in ground testing.
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Similarly, recovery systems employing nets, or tail hook arrested landings induce
additional structural ground test and/or analysis. Again, the low altitude and airspeed
normally associated with these tests require a method of intervention that is quick and
correct. Some recovery systems incorporate ground and airborne transponders to provide
autonomous glide path control. Others accomplish this task using differential GPS and
radar altimeters. All of these subsystem components need to be tested prior to integrated
system testing. Automated wave-off programs have been used successfully in place of
operator intervention. The complexities imposed by environmental conditions (density
altitude, wind, etc.) must be thoroughly documented and accounted for. When ship
motion is added to the equation, the need for extensive modeling and simulation of the
recovery system, prior to flight, becomes apparent.
Operational Testing– The issues that need to be addressed for operational suitability of
a UAV/UCAV system are generally not unlike those normally considered for manned
aircraft. Where applicable, some of the critical points have been addressed in previous
sections. One complicating factor is the myriad Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) that
have been introduced for UAV fielding. The frequent use of accelerated acquisition
processes, and COTS equipment, require additional consideration during developmental
testing. Some issues to consider include:
1. Will the COTS software package, or operating system be supported by the time the
system is fielded?
2. Has the COTS hardware received sufficient environmental testing (particularly if
shipboard operations are planned) to ensure survival in the intended environment?
3. Does the CONOPS preclude field (Operational Level) maintenance, and is this
reasonable given DT experience with maintenance issues/problems?
4. Is planned operator and maintainer training sufficient to support the system based
on DT experience?
5. Will the tested air vehicle envelope support operations in the CONOPS planned
environments (hot, cold, high density altitude, etc.)?
6. Was the EMC testing conducted during the developmental tests consistent with the
expected environment specified by the CONOPS? Communication center and shipboard
RF environments are intense and system should be tested against them prior to fielding.
Additionally, many UAV systems still require gasoline and two-stroke oil. These are no
longer a part of many military Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) logistics support
plans. A plan must be in place to provide logistical support for any of these required
materials. Similarly, back up batteries may be difficult to support due to hazardous
materials issues, or the lack of recharging facilities. Electrical requirements must be
consistent with the sources available within the unit structure defined by the CONOPS.
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Interoperability - The utility of any UAV system is limited if the data collected by it’s
sensors, and the control of targets to be prosecuted is “stove piped” Military systems
intended to meet Joint Services needs are required to meet interoperability standards in
order to ensure that they can provide mission data that can be used by used by any of the
forces involved in a campaign. The Joint Interoperability Testing Command (JITC) is
responsible for setting and verifying these standards.
Similarly, at an International level, standards are necessary to ensure that NATO
countries can control and exploit the product provided by UAV systems. To this end,
reference (9), NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 4586 has been developed.
This agreement details the processes and interfaces required to provide for command and
control as well as data exploitation for various legacy and developmental UAV systems
operated by NATO countries. Excerpts from the Human Computer Interface appendix
from STANAG 4586, of interest to UAV system testers are included as Appendix E of
this document.
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CHAPTER 4
A CRUISE MISSILE PERSPECTIVE
Background - This chapter primarily focuses on some interesting differences in the
processes currently used to conduct Tomahawk Cruise Missile flight tests as opposed to
UAV flight tests by the Naval Air Systems Command. These differences have developed
over the history of the Tomahawk weapon system for a variety of reasons. Since it is a
sea-launched weapon that was not designed for recovery, it was natural that it was
originally a Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) weapon program. Coordination of
the complex flight test program and the program management was eventually passed to
NAVAIR. Early development tests started approximately twenty years ago, and the
program had some joint development with the Air Force, which also impacted the
program processes.
The Tomahawk Cruise Missile can be launched from surface ships or submarines using a
solid rocket booster with thrust vector control to achieve sufficient altitude and airspeed
to transition to cruise flight. Submarine variants use a gas generator to expel the missile
from the vertical or horizontal launch tube prior to rocket motor ignition. Transition to
cruise requires a complex series of precisely timed events including; wing and fin
extension, inlet extension (or cover jettison), and engine start. Once the transition is
complete, the missile is essentially a turbojet (or turbofan) powered UAV capable of
flights in excess of 750 nautical miles at speeds in excess of Mach 0.7. It flies a precise
pre-programmed route using multiple navigation systems. These include Terrain Contour
Mapping (TERCOM), Digital Scene Mapping and Correlation (DSMAC), and Global
Positioning System (GPS).
In addition, the new Bock IV variant, also known as Tactical Tomahawk adds several
new capabilities. Included is the ability to receive and transmit messages via satellite to
allow the strike or missile controller to select among multiple pre-planned targets, or even
enter a new target in flight. The missile can also transmit images back to allow
assessment of previous strikes, and report its own health and status prior to impact.
It is obviously difficult to draw a distinction between this weapon and what is normally
referred to as a UAV based on a technical comparison. The only real difference is that
with Tomahawk there is no intent to recover and reuse the weapon. However, earlier
variants are often equipped with a Recovery Exercise Module (REM) for flight tests. The
REM allows the missile to strike a “point in space” target, then climb or descend to a
recovery area and deploy a parachute. The missile then can be refurbished and re-used.
Despite these striking similarities, the organization and processes for Tomahawk flight
test are very different from those of Navy UAV programs.
Organization - At the time of the first Tomahawk Developmental Flight tests, the
NAVAIR policy for UAV testing had not been developed. In fact, the only Navy UAV
in that time period was the Pioneer RPV, which was deployed outside of the normal
acquisition and testing process. Since that time, the Tomahawk management and testing
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has evolved into an organization that is somewhat unique within NAVAIR. There are
three Program management agencies (PMAs), each lead by Navy Captains who manage
the Tomahawk Weapon System. PMA-280 is responsible for the missile itself, as well as
the rocket booster, and the container it is loaded in (different for different ships or
launcher types). This is referred to as the All Up Round (AUR). PMA-281 manages the
mission planning system for designing missions, assigning targets, and transmitting that
data to the ship or submarine. PMA-282 is responsible for the weapon control system,
which is the crew interface for programming, aligning, and firing the missile. These
PMAs are under the command of the Program Executive Officer for Strike Weapons and
UAVs (PEO (W)). The Program Executive Officer is a Rear Admiral billet. Within this
same organization, but independent of the PMAs, and reporting directly to the PEO or his
deputy, is a small organization called the Tomahawk Cruise Missile Flight Test and
Evaluation Directorate (PEO (W)-CT).
This organization places the responsibility for Tomahawk flight testing outside the
traditional NAVAIR matrix organization. The result is that a smaller core team with
extensive Tomahawk flight test experience is responsible for all of the required risk
management tools discussed in chapter one. There are risks and benefits to this approach.
The most significant risk in this structure is the potential for programmatic pressure to
influence test planning and execution decision-making. This is due to the fact that
program management is closer to the test team compared to almost all other programs
that have a division in reporting chains between the Program Executive Office and the
NAVAIR test organization.
Test Operations – Tomahawk flight tests are very complex events. Typically, they
require from three to five high-speed chase aircraft. For tests on the west coast, these are
usually Navy F-14 and QF-4 aircraft. For tests on the east coast, Air Force F-15 and F-16
aircraft are normally used. Each chase aircraft carries at least one AST-5A pod known as
a Remote Command and Control (RCC) pod. This pod is integrates to a control box in
the cockpit and interfaces with the Recovery Exercise Module (REM), or Range Safety
System (RSS) in the missile. It allows the chase aircrew to maneuver the missile on
track, over-ride the missile flight path, or terminate the missile flight if these actions are
required due to anomalies, failures, or external issues (weather, traffic, etc.). A detailed
description of the RCC system is provided as appendix F.
In addition to the chase aircraft, missions typically require at least one tanker aircraft
(normally a KC-135 equipped to refuel Navy aircraft), a telemetry relay platform (NP3D, or E-9 with phased array antenna), and three to five recovery helicopters.
The Navy Test Conductor (NTC) operating from the control room must communicate
with and coordinate all of these aircraft as well as the launch platform, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), any support ships, and the target range.
Communications relay facilities are often required.
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Obviously, the missions normally start over water. Telemetry data is carefully monitored
to verify the health of the missile before a decision is made to transit inland on one of
several Instrument Routes (IR) approved for Tomahawk testing that lead to the target
range. The status of the entire package (missile, chase aircraft, tanker, and relay aircraft)
must be confirmed before this landfall decision is made.
Execution of these complex tests is highly dependent on the group of individuals
involved in the preparations. This small team of highly experienced personnel is drawn
primarily from the Naval Air Warfare Center – Weapons Division (NAWC-WD), but
includes personnel from the Aircraft Division (NAWC-AD), the launch platform, weapon
system contractors. Personnel from all of these organizations are involved throughout the
test planning process.
Test Planning – Test planning for a specific Tomahawk test commences approximately
five months prior to the launch window. A series of five structured meetings (plus others
as needed) comprise the planning process. During these meetings, all aspects of the test
and mission are carefully reviewed to ensure readiness for the test during the scheduled
launch window. Subjects covered include, but are not limited to:
1. Mission readiness, including simulated runs to validate mission compliance with
range safety and performance requirements.
2. Platform readiness (Ship or Sub) to ensure the crew and systems are ready for
test.
3. Weapon control System Readiness to include any software or hardware upgrades.
4. Range readiness including all asset availability, range safety, and contingency
planning.
5. AUR readiness including all test specific modifications and the build history of
the missile
6. Configuration of the system and documentation of all approved changes.
Turnover Brief – The turnover brief is conducted approximately 22 weeks before a
planned test event. This first planning meeting is the smallest, and essentially involves
the mission objectives, funding, command and control structure, and platform
identification being “turned over” to the Test Operations Branch.
Working Group Meeting (WGM) – The working group meeting is the next major event
in the planning process, and takes place approximately 20 weeks before the scheduled
launch. During this session the test team will review the objectives and compliance
criteria to ensure that the objectives are testable within the range constraints. Based on
the objectives, a Naval Message known as a Mission Planning Worksheet (MPW) is
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developed to task the mission planner to develop a mission with the required flight profile
and events. For Block IV missiles, a Strike Planning Worksheet which tasks the missile
controller with sending messages to the missile via the Tomahawk Strike Network may
also be required.
Test Planning Meeting (TPM) – This meeting involves all elements of the test team and
covers the mission in great detail. It occurs approximately twelve weeks prior to the
planned launch date. The Flight Test Manager from PEO (W) is responsible for
coordinating with all team members before and after this meeting to ensure that all
preparations are complete in time for the next meeting approximately seven weeks later.
A draft of the comprehensive test plan for the mission, known as the Mission Firing Plan
(MFP) is provided at this meeting.
Mission Readiness Review (MRR) – The MRR is a comprehensive review of all aspects
of the mission chaired by the PEO (W) Operations Branch Head. At this point, the
mission planning and validation efforts should be complete. All range assets and aircraft
should be scheduled. Weapon on load and operations briefings should be scheduled.
Platform preparations should be complete. Strike planning should be complete. Final
component and subsystem testing should be complete. System configuration should be
finalized and approved by the appropriate authorities. The MFP is updated and should be
essentially complete at the close of this meeting.
Mission Control Panel (MCP) – PEO (W), or his deputy chairs The MCP approximately
two weeks prior to the test. The panel consists of the Captains from each of the PMAs,
The Director of the PEO (W) Test and Evaluation Directorate, and may include senior
personnel from other Navy or contractor organizations involved in the test. The purpose
of the MCP is to gain Flag level approval to execute the mission. PEO (W) is the final
decision authority. All aspects of the mission /test preparations are briefed and followed
by a recommendation whether or not to proceed. The panel may request additional
information in any area. The meeting concludes with Panel deliberations followed by the
decision. The decision to proceed may be predicated on completion of mission critical
action items requested by the Panel. The final version of the MFP is distributed
following the MCP. It contains guidance for all participants during the flight test.
Following approval of the mission at the MCP, two formal briefings take place. The
mission brief normally takes place on board the ship or sub, and includes the Navy Test
Conductor, the Flight Test Manager, the Platform Test Coordinator, and all critical
crewmembers. The Operations brief takes place at the range facilities (NAWC-WD Point
Mugu or Eglin Air Force Base) and includes all of the control room personnel, aircrew,
and support personnel. Additional splinter briefs of real time data analysts and chase
aircrew are also typical.
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Summary – The organization, and processes used for Tomahawk testing have many
distinct advantages over the traditional Naval Aviation test processes employed by UAV
and UCAV programs. The fact that planning and execution are conducted by a team of
personnel with extensive experience in Tomahawk flight testing allows flexibility not
available to the larger organization which makes extensive use of personnel throughout
the organization as needed. These “matrix” personnel may have experience in a
competency such as airworthiness assessment of structures or EMC. However, because
they are unfamiliar with the “system of systems” that comprises Tomahawk (or any
specific platform), they would require considerably more data to assess a change. They
are also more likely to be in the process of reviewing airworthiness issues for multiple
platforms, thus reducing their responsiveness and adding additional time to the process.
The essential functions of risk management are not significantly different, but they are
completed by a core group of experienced personnel, with ultimate authority for decision
making residing within the Program Executive Office.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions - In general, many aspects of UAV or UCAV test planning and execution
are not significantly different from manned aircraft testing. Attention to the same risk
factors is required, and much of the data to be collected is very similar. There are
however, unique requirements and differences that need to be understood in order to
develop effective and successful test programs.
Risk Management – Knowledge of the particular system to be tested is necessary in
order to properly scope many of the risk management efforts required for testing. In
particular, airworthiness needs to be tailored based on the size and complexity of the
system under test. The cost of obtaining an airworthiness approval (Naval Flight
Clearance, etc.) could otherwise exceed the cost to design and test the system in the case
of micro or small UAVs. The same is true of range safety requirements. If the UAV can
be kept within approved boundaries with fail-safe or flight termination systems, and
poses little threat to property, loss of the air vehicle may become an acceptable risk. This
is diametrically opposed to the entire philosophy of manned aircraft Risk Management.
Ground Testing – Many UAV systems lend themselves to taking advantage of ground
tests that would be difficult or impossible with a manned aircraft. This includes the
ability to “hang” the aircraft in order to control attitude while stimulating sensors to
evaluate flight control and attitude sensing response.
Instrumentation – Smaller UAV systems may provide little or no capacity for carrying
extensive instrumentation for flight tests. Conversely, it is possible to take advantage of
built in systems (optical sensors, ground station data linked information, etc.) to provide
the necessary test data at little cost.
System Testing – While the requirement for system testing in additional to air vehicle
testing exists for manned aircraft the systems are vastly different. An understanding of
the flight control modes is critical to allow development of tests for critical components
which may include more ground based than airborne equipment (ground station, GDT,
launch and recovery systems for example).
Organization – Comparison of the organizations currently conducting Navy UAV flight
tests with the organization testing the Tomahawk Cruise Missile leads to the conclusion
that efficiencies can be achieved using a core group of personnel with extensive
experience with the air specific vehicle and systems. This is not to say that the current
Cruise Missile test organization is ideal as it does lend itself to programmatic pressure on
test team decision-making processes. In either organization, the critical elements of test
discipline and proper risk assessment must be acknowledged and accepted throughout the
organizational chain of command.
Pilots – Pilot or operator training is often misunderstood and underestimated as a critical
path to UAV testing. It is even more critical for systems using rate control and external
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pilots. Even complex and fully autonomous systems often employ such modes for
reversionary or emergency control.
Recommendations – The following actions are recommended for any organization
developing a UAV test program:
Risk Management - It is recommended that agencies planning a UAV test program
should look carefully at the characteristics of the system when establishing a risk
management strategy. Adapting manned policies for airworthiness and range safety is
simply not appropriate for smaller systems, and can lead to huge expense and slow
progress.
Ground Testing - A creative approach is recommended for ground testing to take full
advantage of the ability to stimulate sensors while manipulating air vehicle attitude prior
to flight test.
Instrumentation - For smaller UAV system testing, a creative approach to
instrumentation and data collection is also recommended. Much of the required data may
be available via on board sensors, and the data being sent to and from the ground control
station.
Organizational Structure - Test team organizational structure is a major element in the
success and efficiency of any test team. While a matrix or “competency aligned”
organization allows flexibility as projects come and go, consideration should be given to
establishing a more permanent platform test organization for any program that is
expected to be in testing for a significant time. This will prevent re-learning hard lessons
about systems and processes needed for successful test execution.
Pilots - Pilot or operator selection and training should begin early in the planning process.
In addition to the necessary control skills, an understanding of flight test principles and
engineering is just as necessary as it is for manned aircraft testing. Human factors with
respect to the ground station man-machine interface should also be considered early in
the design process.
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APPENDIX A
EMC SAFETY OF FLIGHT TEST PROCEDURE
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Typical Tactical Class EMC SOFT Test Procedure
PIONEER CARS WITH IDAN EMC SOFT
Buno ______ C-Band ___Ghz

UHF ___Mhz

CARS ___ Ghz

Test Group Ground Power
1.

Apply ground power to air vehicle with battery installed.

2.

Configure GCS OBY for payload installed - Mkd-200 (video inop).

3.

Confirm RF communication with the UAV (both links, low power omni).

4.

Confirm CARS emitting and transponder operating.

5.

Run RPV Automatic test. IDAN ON and OFF Note all failures. Expect 72, 73,90
with IDAN OFF
No Fails with IDAN ON.
Fail steps 72,73,89,90 with IDAN OFF
72- expected 1.68, received 1.48
73- expected 3.36, received 2.92
89- expected -1.68, received -1.44
90- expected -3.36, received -2.80

6.

Verify all Pioneer warning lights are extinguished.

7.

Select all UAV TX to low power.

8.

Select all GCS TX to low power.

Aircraft Power - Engine Running
1.

Start RPV engine

2.

Verify engine idle 3200-3500 RPM select A/V Power

3.

Verify RF communication on all links, IDAN ON.

4.

Verify Pioneer EP control checks under the following conditions:
a)

C-band short secure commanding - low power.

b) C-band clear commanding - low power.
c)

UHF commanding - low power.
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6.

Command >5000 RPM

7.

Verify Pioneer EP control checks under the following conditions:
a)

C-band short secure commanding.

b) C-band clear commanding.
c)

UHF commanding.

8.

CMD RPM to idle.

9.

Select all UAV TX to high power.

10. Select all GCS TX to high power.
12. Verify all Pioneer warning lights are extinguished.
13. Select all UAV TX to low power.
14. Select all GCS TX to low power.
15. Repeat 3 through 14 with IDAN OFF.
16. Configure RPV for engine shut down
17. Secure Engine.
18. Secure RPV Power.

No anomalies were noted other than the autotest steps with IDAN OFF. Control
surfaces in all transmit and receive modes with IDAN OFF or ON operated smoothly
with consistent force and positioning. No oscillation or hunting was observed in any
mode.
The failed steps were previously identified and expected as described by Class Desk
email of 4 October 1999, and 4.1.2.2 engineering analysis of 27 September 1999. Steps
concerned status reports only and did not impact commands.
AV Serial Number ___ CARS/IDAN Pink sheet SOFT block was signed based on
this test on 19 October 1999.
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APPENDIX B
COOPER-HARPER RATING SCALES
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Cooper-Harper Ratings

Aircraft
Characteristics
Yes
Is it satisfactory without
improvement?

No
Yes
Is adequate
performance
attainable with a
tolerable pilot
workload?

Deficiencies
warrant
improvement

Demands on pilot in
selected task or required RATING

Excellent
Highly

Pilot compensation not a factor
for desired performance

1

Good--negligible
deficiencies

Pilot compensation not a factor for
desired performance

2

Fair--some mildly
unpleasant

Minimal pilot compensation required
for desired performance

3

Desired performance requires moderate
pilot compensation

4

Minor but annoying
deficiencies
Moderately
objection-

Adequate performance requires
considerable pilot compensation

Adequate performance requires extensive
Very objectionable but
compensation
tolerable deficiencies
pilot compensation

No

Yes

Deficiencies
require
improvement

Is
it controllable?

No

Improvement
mandatory

PILOT DECISIONS
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5
6

Major deficiencies

Adequate performance not attainable with
max tolerable pilot comp-control not in
question

7

Major

Considerable pilot compensation is required
for control

8

Major

Intense pilot compensation is required to
retain control

Major

Control will be lost during some portion of
required operation

9
10

Modified Cooper-Harper

Difficulty
Yes
Is
Mental Workload
Level Acceptable?

No

Yes
Are
Errors Small and
Inconsequential?

No
Yes
Even Though Errors May be
Large or Frequent, Can
Instructed Task be
Accomplished Most of the
Time?

No

Mental
Workload is High
and
Should be Reduced

Major Deficiencies,
System Redesign is
Strongly
Recommended

Operator mental effort is minimal and desired
performance is easily attainable

1

Easy
Desirabl

Operator mental effort is low and
desired performance is attainable

Fair,
Mild Difficulty

Acceptable operator mental effort is required
to attain adequate system performance

2
3

Minor but Annoying
Difficulty

Moderately high operator mental effort is
required to obtain adequate system performance

4

Moderately Objectionable Difficulty

High operator mental effort is required to
attain adequate system performance

5

Very Objectionable but
tolerable difficulty

Maximum operator mental effort is required
to attain adequate system performance

6

Major Difficulty

Maximum operator mental effort is required
to bring errors to moderate level

7

Major Difficulty

Maximum operator mental effort is required
to avoid large or numerous errors

8

Intense operator mental effort is required to
accomplish task, frequent/ numerous errors
persist

9

Impossible

OPERATOR DECISIONS
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Rating

Very Easy,
Highly Desirable

Major Difficulty

Major
Deficiencies,
System Redesign
is Mandatory

Operator Demand

Instructed task cannot be accomplished
reliably

10
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SUMMARY

The purpose of this test program was to evaluate the effect of a simulated jammer
package on the flying qualities and performance (FQ&P) of the BQM-147A vehicle
and assess the suitability of the vehicle for the expendable jammer and training
missions. This report presents the results of the six FQ&P test flights completed at the
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Activity between 11 July 1991 and 18 March
1992. Flying qualities of the vehicle and antenna structural integrity were evaluated
at a cruise power setting of 6,000 RPM with the lower antenna retracted and extended,
and at full power with the lower antenna retracted. Straight line speed runs and stall
tests were not completed due to funding and time constraints. The BQM-147A
vehicle's rapid and well damped response to longitudinal stick inputs is an enhancing
characteristic that should be incorporated in future remotely piloted vehicle designs.
This characteristic will reduce the required skill level and minimize the training
requirements for BQM-147A operators. No deficiencies and one enhancing
characteristic were identified during this test. The flying qualities of the BQM-147A
with a simulated jammer package proved to be very similar to those of the basic
BQM-147A. Within the scope of this test, the FQ&P of the BQM-147A unmanned
air vehicle are satisfactory for the expendable jammer and training missions. If the
vehicle is to be used for the reconnaissance mission, it is recommended that further
testing be conducted involving tracking of ground targets to ascertain whether the
lightly damped Dutch roll will adversely effect the quality of video imagery,
especially in turbulent atmospheric conditions.
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INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
1. The Marine Corps has an operational requirement for a small, expendable remotely
piloted vehicle (RPV) to transport an electronic communications jammer to a
predesignated target area. EXDRONE, an RPV formerly known as EXJAM 80, was
developed in 1981 by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in
response to the Marine Corps requirement. This unmanned air vehicle (UAV) is
intended to satisfy the requirements of lower level tactical units and small ships for a
capability to investigate local area activities. The UAV Joint Program Office has placed
EXDRONE in a special category called Very Low Cost UAV. EXDRONE has been
modified to carry a global positioning system (GPS) navigation receiver and VHF
communication jammer payload to support the Marine Air Group Task Force
Commander by providing a low cost, highly effective alternative to ground-based
communication jamming systems. EXDRONE has been officially designated as the
BQM-147A.
2. NAVAIRWARCENACDIV Patuxent River, MD, was tasked by reference I to
integrate and test a GPS navigation system and a VHF communication jammer package
for the BQM-147A vehicle and validate the system through ground and flight testing.
The flying qualities and performance (FQ&P) tests were conducted at the Naval
Electronic Systems Engineering Activity between 11 July 1991 and 18 March 1992.
PURPOSE
3. The purpose of this test program was to evaluate the effect of the jammer package on
the FQ&P of the vehicle and assess the suitability of the vehicle for the expendable
jammer and training missions.
DESCRIPTION OF TEST AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT
4. The BQM-147A was a low cost, remotely piloted, expendable drone. The vehicle
was a delta planform flying wing with drooped leading edge anhedral wingtip
extensions. These extensions were intended to enhance the low speed flying qualities of
the vehicle. Directional stability was provided by a single vertical stabilizer mounted
centrally on top of the trailing edge of the wing. Control moments were provided by
separate elevators and ailerons mounted on the trailing edge of the wing, and a rudder
mounted on the vertical stabilizer. The vehicle was powered by a one cylinder, two
cycle, air cooled engine capable of producing approximately 7 bhp. A three-view
drawing of the test vehicle is presented in appendix B, figure 1.

5.

The flight control system consisted of an uplink receiver connected to an
autopilot and electrical servo motors that actuated the flight control surfaces and throttle
via push/pull rods. The autopilot provided essential flight reference information, and
varying degrees of vehicle flight control assistance. The autopilot allowed the vehicle to
be flown either manually, with the assistance of a wing leveler, or fully autonomously.
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6. For the purpose of this test, a simulated jammer package was installed in the test
vehicle. This package consisted of a fixed 3 ft antenna mounted on top of the
fuselage about midway between the nose and tail, an electrically retractable 3 ft
antenna mounted under the fuselage directly beneath the upper antenna, and an
internal weight to simulate the mass of the electronic components. The locations of
the antennas are indicated in appendix B, figure 1.
7. The only instrumentation parameters available from the vehicle were engine
RPM, barometric altitude, and heading. These parameters were not sufficient for the
flying qualities testing that also required at least a rough idea of the vehicle's pitch
and roll angles, as well as the rates about all three axes. The data were derived by
placing an overlay with pitch and roll markings over the video screen. A copy of this
overlay is presented in appendix B, figure 2. A hand-held stopwatch was used to
time the relevant vehicle motions.
SCOPE OF TESTS
8. NAVAIRWARCENACDIV Patuxent River completed a total of six FQ&P test
flights (4.9 flight-hours) of the BQM-147A test vehicle with a simulated jammer
package installed. These tests were conducted at or below 1,200 ft MSL with ambient
temperatures between 85°F and 90°F for the first five flights, and approximately 40°F
for the final flight. Flying qualities of the vehicle and antenna structural integrity
were evaluated at a cruise power setting of 6,000 RPM with the lower antenna
retracted and extended, and at full power with the lower antenna retracted. The flight
test configuration matrix is presented in appendix C, table I. The flight test
accomplishment matrix is presented in appendix C, table II. The proposed straight
line speed runs and stall tests were not completed due to funding and time
constraints.
METHOD OF TESTS
9. The structural integrity of the antennas was evaluated by observing their ability
to withstand the forces imposed on them during the FQ&P testing. The power setting
was, however, limited to a cruise setting when the lower antenna was extended,
since this antenna was not designed to be extended during the high-speed dash
portion of the mission profile.
10. The flying qualities of the BQM-147A vehicle were evaluated using variations
of the flying qualities test techniques for manned aircraft, which are described in
reference 2. It was possible to use the standard manned aircraft techniques in most
cases because most of the flying qualities testing was conducted from the internal
pilot station using the onboard video for reference. Details of the specific techniques
used are contained in the FQ&P matrix of appendix C, table II. The major exceptions
to the use of standard manned aircraft techniques were takeoff and landing. These
operations are normally performed by the external pilot whose only references are
the visual appearance of the vehicle and the sound of the engine. It was very difficult
to define meaningful, measurable tasks for these operations. Consequently, the
evaluation of the takeoff and landing flying qualities was based solely on the
subjective opinion of the external pilot.
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11. Two mission relatable tasks were used in conjunction with the Cooper-Harper
handling qualities rating scale to help evaluate the lateral/directional characteristics.
The Cooper-Harper scale is presented in appendix A. The tasks used were a bank
angle capture task and a heading capture task. The tasks were performed in rudderonly and aileron-only turns. The tolerances for the tasks were defined as ±2 deg
desired and ±5 deg acceptable for both tasks.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
ANTENNA STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
12. The structural integrity of the jammer antennas was evaluated over the full
operational envelope of the vehicle from takeoff to maximum level flight speed for
the upper antenna, and takeoff to the 6,000 RPM level flight speed for the lower
antenna. The first upper antenna to be tested exhibited severe oscillations
throughout the entire speed range and failed within 10 min of takeoff. The second
upper antenna remained intact throughout the remainder of the flights and showed
only minor vibration at very high speeds. No problems were observed with the
structural integrity of the lower antenna. The failure of the lust antenna proved to be
due to a manufacturing defect that should not be seen in the production antennas.
Since the good upper antenna and the lower antenna both lasted for more than four
flights, their strength will be more than adequate for the expendable jammer mission
that will require only one flight per vehicle. Within the scope of this test, the
structural integrity of the current antenna design is satisfactory for the expendable
jammer mission.

TAKEOFF AND LANDING FLYING QUALITIES AND
PERFORMANCE
TAKEOFF
13. The takeoff tests were conducted from a smooth hard-surfaced taxiway near
sea level with light winds and ambient temperatures between 85°F and 90°F.
Initially, the bungee was stretched to 100 ft. This resulted in the vehicle rolling 15 to
20 ft past the bungee stakes before lifting from the dolly. An increase in bungee
stretch to 105 ft resulted in a liftoff point closer to the end of the bungee stroke. In
all cases, the climbout was shallow, but the vehicle was stable and responded
positively to the controls. With the exception of the shallow climb, this takeoff
performance was similar to the BQM-147A vehicle's performance without the
jammer package. The extra weight of the, simulated jammer package, and the
presence of the antennas will not adversely impact the ability to launch the
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BQM-147A, provided the 105 ft bungee stretch is used. Within the scope of this
test, the takeoff performance and flying qualities of the BQM-147A vehicle with
simulated jammer package and antennas are satisfactory for safely launching the
vehicle on expendable jammer and training missions.
LANDING
. 14. The landing tests were conducted on a smooth hard-surfaced taxiway near sea
level with light winds and ambient temperatures between 85°F and 90°F. The
landing speed appeared to be higher than the nonjammer version of the BQM-147A
vehicle due to the additional weight. However, the pilot did not have difficulty
landing on or maintaining the centerline of the landing surface. The vehicle did not
show any tendency to depart from controlled flight at approach and landing speeds.
The extra weight of the jammer package and the presence of the antennas will not
adversely impact the ability to safely recover the vehicle on training missions.
Within the scope of this test, the landing performance and flying qualities of the
BQM-147A vehicle with simulated jammer package and antennas are satisfactory
for safely recovering the vehicle during training missions.
UP AND AWAY FLYING QUALITIES
LONGITUDINAL FLYING QUALITIES
Static Stability
15. An attempt was made to quantify the static stability with the vehicle trimmed
at 6,000 RPM with the lower antenna retracted. Additionally, the static stability
was evaluated qualitatively throughout the test series. Qualitatively, the vehicle
exhibited positive static stability in all configurations throughout the tested flight
envelope. No differences were noticed between the antenna extended and antenna
retracted configurations. The quantitative results are presented in table I. The
results of the quantitative test were difficult to apply in a conventional manner due to
the coarseness of the RPM measurement (60 RPM increments), and the difficulty of
relating RPM to airspeed. However, the test results did tend to corroborate the
qualitative observation of positive static stability. The positive longitudinal static
stability will assist in making the vehicle easier to handle under manual control
during jammer and training missions. Within the scope of this test, the longitudinal
static stability of the BQM-147A vehicle is satisfactory for the expendable jammer
and training missions.
Table I
LONGITUDINAL STATIC STABILITY AT 6,000 RPM
Stick Position
1/16 in. forward
neutral
1/16 in. aft
1/8 in. aft

Engine RPM
6,000
6,000
5,880
5,760

.
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Dynamic Stability and Control
Response to Longitudinal Stick Inputs

16.
The response to longitudinal stick inputs was tested at 6,000 RPM with the
lower antenna retracted and extended and at full throttle with the antenna retracted.
Sinusoidal stick pumping was used to identify the short period damped natural
frequency. Pitch doublets were used to estimate the short period damping ratio. The
results from the stick pumping and pitch doublets are presented in table H. No
difference was noted between the characteristics with the antenna extended or
retracted. No overshoots were observed after the pitch doublets, thus indicating a
highly damped condition for all tested configurations. The damped natural
frequency was quite high at cruise power settings with an even higher frequency at
high power settings. The high natural frequency coupled with the heavy damping
made precise control of the pitch attitude exceptionally easy. This combination of
responses to longitudinal control inputs will make the vehicle easy to handle in
pitch under manual control and in both steady and maneuvering flight. This will
reduce the required skill level and minimize the training requirements for BQM147A operators. The BQM-147A vehicle's rapid and well damped response to
longitudinal stick inputs is an enhancing characteristic that should be incorporated in
future RPV designs.

Table II
SHORT PERIOD CHARACTERISTICS

Power Setting
6,000 RPM
6,000 RPM
Max

Antenna Position
Retracted
Extended
Retracted

Damped Natural
Frequency
(sec-1)
4.8
4.8
6.3

Damping Ratio
> 0.7
> 0.7
> 0.7

Phugoid Mode
17. The phugoid mode was evaluated at 6,000 RPM with the lower antenna both
retracted and extended, and at full throttle with the antenna retracted. The test was
performed by pulling the nose of the vehicle approximately 10 deg above the
horizon to slow the airspeed, then releasing the stick. Data were obtained by
counting the number of pitch overshoots and measuring the time taken for the nose to
move away from the horizon and back again. This allowed the calculation of the
phugoid period and approximate damping ratio. The data from these tests are
presented in table III. The data indicate that power setting has a significant effect on
the phugoid period, since the period is doubled by going from 6,000 RPM to full
throttle. This is probably more of an airspeed effect than a power effect, and it would
be expected since the period of the phugoid mode is generally proportional to the
airspeed. Power did not, however, affect the damping, since both antenna-retracted
points exhibited a heavily damped phugoid with only two overshoots. Antenna
position had no effect on the period, but did have a significant effect on the
damping. When the antenna was retracted, the phugoid was heavily damped,
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However, extension of the lower antenna yielded an essentially undamped phugoid
mode. The maneuver had to be terminated due to airspace constraints after
approximately five overshoots with no apparent reduction in amplitude. This
reduced damping also showed up as difficulty in precisely trimming the vehicle in
pitch. With the lower antenna extended, the vehicle exhibited a constant tendency
to drift up or down regardless of the position of the trim lever. This tendency was a
minor annoyance, but could be easily controlled as long as the pilot paid attention
to his altitude. Additionally, this trimming difficulty did not appear to significantly
impact the performance of the autopilot during the limited autopilot testing that was
completed. Even though the undamped phugoid mode with the lower antenna
extended is a minor annoyance while under manual control, it will not have a
significant adverse impact on the ability of the BQM-147A vehicle to accomplish
the expendable jammer or training missions. Within the scope of this test, the
phugoid mode of the BQM-147A vehicle is satisfactory for the expendable jammer
and training missions.
Table III
PHUGOID CHARACTERISTICS
Power Setting
6,000 RPM
6,000 RPM
Max

Antenna Position
Retracted
Extended
Retracted

Period
(sec)
19
20
40

Damping Ratio
0.5
0.0
0.5

Dynamic Stability and Control
Roll Mode
18. The roll mode characteristics were evaluated at 6,000 RPM with the antenna
retracted and extended using a bank-to-bank roll technique. This technique involved
starting from a 20 deg bank angle, establishing a steady-state roll rate, and releasing
the stick as the bank angle passed through zero. The time to go from the stick release
to zero roll rate was then recorded and used to calculate the roll mode time constant. A
qualitative evaluation of the roll mode was also made using a bank angle capture task
during aileron-only turns at 6,000 RPM with the antenna retracted and extended, and
at full throttle with the antenna retracted. Quantitatively, the roll mode time constant
was too short to measure with hand-held instrumentation. It is estimated to be less than
0.1 sec. This short time constant gave the vehicle a quick and well damped response to
lateral stick inputs. Bank angle capture tasks were easy at all power settings both to
the left and to the right. The bank angle capture task was slightly easier to accomplish
with the antenna extended (HQR 2) than it was with the antenna retracted (HQR 3).
The maximum roll rate was not evaluated quantitatively; however, the internal pilot
did not feel the need to use full lateral stick at any time during the test flights.
Therefore, the maximum roll rate was judged to be more than adequate. The crisp and
well damped roll response will make the vehicle easy to control in roll for the manual
portions of the expendable jammer and training missions. Within the scope of this
test, the roll mode response of the BQM-147A vehicle is satisfactory for the
expendable jammer and training missions.
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Spiral Mode
19.
The spiral mode characteristics were evaluated from left and right 20 deg banked
turns at 6,000 RPM with the lower antenna extended and retracted, and at full throttle
with the antenna retracted. The 6,000 RPM point with the antenna extended was also
completed with the wing leveler on. The test results are presented in table IV. These data
indicate that the vehicle was unstable to the left and stable or neutral to the right. This
result was verified by the necessity to hold some top aileron or rudder in stabilized left
turns. It was also slightly more stable at higher power settings, and had longer time
constants with the lower antenna extended. The longer time constants could be due to
either greater rolling moment of inertia or higher roll damping. Engaging the wing
leveler had the desired effect of stabilizing the spiral mode, both to the left and to the
right. The difference in times between the two different techniques indicated a lack of
absolute aileron centering; however, this had no significant effect on the flying
qualities.

Table IV
SPIRAL MODE CHARACTCHARACTERISTICS

Power
Setting
6,000 RPM
6,000 RPM
6,000 RPM
Maximum

NOTES:

Antenna
Position
Retracted
Extended
Extended
Retracted

Wing
Leveler
Off
Off
On
Off

Time (left turn) (sec)
Control
Control
Into(1)
Away(2)
4.3(3)
7 3(3)
4.6(4)
6.80)

5.6(3)
7 8(3)
—
7.0(3)

Time (right turn) (sec)
Control
Control
Into
Away
> 20(5)
> 20(5)
4.9(4)
> 20(5)

4.5(4)
> 20(5)
3.8(4)

(1) Controls released into turn.
(2) Controls released away from turn.
(3) Time to double amplitude.
(4) Time to one half amplitude.
(5) Angle of bank did not change perceptibly for more than 20 sec.
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Dutch Roll Mode (Wing Leveler Off)
21. The Dutch roll mode was evaluated at 6,000 RPM with the lower antenna
extended and retracted, and at full throttle with the antenna retracted. This
evaluation was accomplished using directional frequency sweeps to determine the
natural frequency, and rudder doublets to determine the roll to yaw and damping
ratios. The quantitative results are presented in table V. A further qualitative
evaluation of the Dutch roll mode effects on mission tasks was accomplished using
bank angle and heading capture tasks during aileron-only and rudder-only turns.
The qualitative data from the mission tasks are presented in appendix C, table III.
The Dutch roll was characterized by a fairly fast, very lightly damped (7 to 9
overshoots) snaking motion. The damping was slightly higher at high power
settings, but it was still very low, displaying about 7 overshoots. A slight
frequency increase was noted for high-power settings and low-power settings
with the antenna extended. This could be explained by the greater fin
effectiveness in the high energy prop wash, and the lower yawing moment of
inertia with the extended antenna. The Dutch roll characteristics did not seriously
affect the bank angle capture tasks because of the low roll to yaw ratio (HQR 23). The heading capture task, however, was very difficult due to excitation of the
Dutch roll mode (HQR 4-6). The motion was easily excited by any aileron or
rudder inputs and atmospheric turbulence, but could be damped by careful use of
ailerons or rudder. The ease with which the Dutch roll was excited led to an
almost constant yaw oscillation that made it impossible to get a stable video image
if any maneuvering was being conducted. The vehicle did, however, remain under
full control and was fairly easy to navigate. External control of the vehicle was
not significantly impacted by the lightly damped Dutch roll. Consequently. the
lightly damped Dutch roll will not seriously affect the ability of the operator to
control the vehicle during training or expendable jammer missions since these
missions do not require accurate nose pointing or tracking. However, the lightly
damped Dutch roll may seriously degrade the quality of the video imagery if the
vehicle is to be used for reconnaissance missions. Within the scope of this test, the
Dutch roll characteristics of the BQM-147A vehicle are satisfactory for the
expendable jammer and training missions. Further testing involving tracking of
ground targets is recommended for the reconnaissance version of the BQM-147A
to ascertain whether the lightly damped Dutch roll will adversely affect the quality
of video imagery, especially in turbulent atmospheric conditions.
Table V
QUANTITATIVE DUTCH ROLL CHARACTERISTICS
Damped Natural Damping Roll-to-Yaw
Power Setting Antenna Position Frequency (sect) Ratio
Ratio
6,000 RPM
Retracted
2.7
< 0.1 Very Low
6,000 RPM
Extended
3.9
< 0.1 Very Low
Maximum
Retracted
3.9
0.1 Very Low
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Dutch Roll/Wing Leveler Interaction
22. The wing leveler function of the autopilot was evaluated during aileron-only
turns at 6,000 RPM with the lower antenna extended. A later qualitative evaluation
was also conducted after the incorporation of a yaw damper in the wing leveler
control laws. Upon engagement of the wing leveler, in its initial configuration, the
vehicle began to oscillate in roll and yaw with a roll-to-yaw ratio somewhat greater
than the Dutch roll, but at approximately the same frequency. The oscillations built
up to an apparent limit cycle with a maximum roll of approximately ±20 deg. All
attempts to damp the oscillations with lateral stick inputs resulted in increased
amplitudes. Rudder could be used to successfully damp the oscillation, however,
phasing of the inputs was critical. If the phasing was not absolutely correct, the
amplitude would increase. Attempts at bank angle capture tasks revealed that if all
oscillations were completely damped out before the maneuver, the actual task of
capturing the desired angle was fairly easy (HQR 3), but the bank angle could not
be maintained for more than a few seconds, as the oscillation would build up
quickly to a limit cycle. If some small oscillations (±5 deg AOB) were present at
the start of the maneuver, the desired bank angle was very difficult to capture (HQR
7), and the magnitude of the oscillations continued to build until the turn had to be
aborted. The oscillations did not appear to have reached any kind of limit cycle by
the time the turn was aborted. The heading capture task could only be
accomplished very roughly, in a completely open loop sense, by releasing the
controls. Any attempt to actively capture a heading resulted in increasing roll/yaw
oscillations. After the incorporation of the yaw damper, heading and bank angle
capture tasks were both easy. Even aggressive control inputs resulted in a maximum
of two roll overshoots with very little movement in yaw. The most significant
impact of the final version of the wing leveler was a dramatic decrease in the roll
control effectiveness. This tends to decrease the maneuverability of the vehicle;
however, it would not significantly effect the expendable jammer or training
missions. Use of the wing leveler/yaw damper combination will significantly
reduce the pilot workload during expendable jammer and training missions. Within
the scope of this test the performance of the wing leveler in conjunction with the
yaw damper is satisfactory for the expendable jammer and training missions.
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CONCLUSIONS

GENERAL
23. The flying qualifies of the BQM-147A with a simulated jammer
package proved to be very similar to those of the basic BQM-147A.
Within the scope of this test, the flying qualities and performance of the
BQM-147A unmanned air vehicle is satisfactory for the expendable
jammer and training missions.
ENHANCING CHARACTERISTIC
24. The BQM-147A vehicle's rapid and well damped response to
longitudinal stick inputs (paragraph 16).
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RECOMMENDATIONS
GENERAL
25. Incorporate the enhancing characteristic in paragraph 24
in future designs.

SPECIFIC
26. Conduct further testing of the reconnaissance version of the BQM-I47A
involving tracking of ground targets to ascertain whether the lightly damped Dutch
roll will adversely affect the quality of video imagery, especially in turbulent
atmospheric conditions (paragraph 21).
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ILLUSTRATIONS
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BQM-147A
Length = 5 ' - 3 "
Wing Span = 8' - 2"
Wing Area = 22.63 sq ft Maximum
Takeoff Weight = 80 lb Dry
Weight = 46 lb
Fuel Weight = 8 lb
Payload Weight = 26 lb

Figure 1
THREE-VIEW DRAWING
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Figure 2
VIDEO OVERLAY
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TABLES
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Table I
BQM-147 FLYING QUALITIES AND PERFORMANCE
TEST CONFIGURATIONS
Landing
Autopilot
Configuration
Pilot Mode
Throttle
Gear
Mode
C a tapult Takeoff
External
Dolly
Max
Disengaged
Power (P)
Cruise (CR )(1)
Landing (L)
Autopilot Cruise
(Auto CR)(2)
NOTES:

External/Internal
External/Internal

Skids
Skids

External
Internal

Skids
Skids

Max
Max Range
Power
Idle Cutoff
Max Range
Power

Disengaged
Disengaged
Disengaged
RC link with
wing leveling

(1) Lower antenna retracted or extended.
(2) Lower antenna extended. All others had lower antenna retracted.

75

Table II
SA-5R-92

BQM-147 FLYING QUALITIES AND PERFORMANCE
FLIGHT TEST ACCOMPLISHMENT MATRIX

Event

Maneuver

Configuration

Altitude
(ft MSL)

1

Takeoff

CTO

SURF - 25

2

Climb

P

25 - 500

3

Static Stability

CR

4

Pitch
Frequency
Sweep

CR, P

1,000 - 1,200 Started slow and increased frequency until
maximum amplitude observed on video pitch
reference.

5

Pitch Doublet

CR, P

1,000 - 1,200 Executed at damped ωsp.
Counted overshoots in α on video pitch reference.

6

Phugoid

CR, P

1,000 - 1,200 Slowed to one large bar nose up on the video
overlay and released.
Recorded times at α = 0.
Noted α peaks on video pitch reference.

7

Yaw
Frequency
Sweep

CR, P

1,000 - 1,200 Started slow and increased frequency until
maximum amplitude observed on video yaw
reference.

8

Rudder
Doublet

CR, P, Auto
CR

9

Bank-to-Bank
Rolls

CR

10 Aileron Turns CR, P. Auto
Only
CR

Remarks
Assessed TO performance and controllability.
Assessed controllability.

1,000 - 1,200 Suppressed phugoid and stabilized at trim RPM.
Moved longitudinal stick and allowed to
stabilize. Recorded new RPM.

1,000 - 1,200 Executed at damped ωd.
Counted overshoots in won video yaw reference.
1.000 - 1,200 Initiated 1/4 to 1/2 stick roll at 20 deg φ,
neutralized controls at 0 deg φ, and timed to 0
roll rate.
1,000 - 1,200 Data taken during entry, steady turn, and exit.
Did left and right turns stabilized at 20, 45, and
60
deg angle of bank.
HQR's
TASK: Bank angle capture, and small bank angle
changes.
Tolerance
Desired: ±2 deg
Acceptable: ±5 deg
Task: Heading capture
Tolerance
Desired: ±2 deg
Acceptable ±5 deg
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Table II (Continued)
Event Maneuver
11 Rudder Only
Turns

Configuration
CR, P

Altitude
(ft MSL)
1,000 - 1,200

Remarks
Data during entry, steady turn, and exit.
Did left and right.
HQR's
TASK: Bank angle capture, and small bank
angle changes.
Tolerance
Desired: -1-2 deg
Acceptable: ±5 deg
Task: Heading capture
Tolerance
Desired: ±2 deg
Acceptable: ±5 deg

12

Flat Turns

CR

1,000 - 1,200

Attempted left and right 360 deg turns.
Task: Maintain 0 deg bank angle.
Tolerance
Desired: - ±2 deg
Acceptable ±5 deg
Task: Heading capture
Tolerance
Desired: -.±2 deg
Acceptable: ±5 deg

13

Spiral
Stability

CR, P. Auto
CR

1,000 - 1,200

14

CR, P

1,000 - 1,200

15
16

Steady
Heading
Landing
1-g Stalls

L
NA

500 - SURF
NA

17

Accel. Stalls

NA

NA

18

Maximum
Flight

NA

NA

Started in 20 deg bank, released controls and
recorded time to half or double amplitude.
Checked for proper aileron centering by
releasing
controls into and away from turn.
Used 1/4, 1/2, and full rudder deflection.
Did left and right.
Recorded pilot comments for normal landing
Not accomplished due to early termination of
test.
Not accomplished due to early termination of
test.
Not accomplished due to early termination of
test.
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APPENDIX E
STANAG 4586 HUMAN FACTORS EXCERPTS
(This information is pulled from several areas in the HCI Appendix of the Baseline Document)
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1 Introduction.

1.1 Scope.
NATO Standardisation Agreement (STANAG 4586) Annex B Appendix B3 specifies the
interface between the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Control System (UCS) and the
Operator. It will be referred throughout this document as the Human Computer
Interface (HCI). STANAG 4586 Annex B Appendix B3 is intended to allow NATO
nations to achieve UAV interoperability.
Standardisation of the HCI is intended to enable NATO nations to achieve
interoperability between UAV Systems and UCS operators by the implementation of a
common set of generic interface standards. A standard HCI should facilitate seamless
integration of NATO UAV systems into joint combined NATO battlefield infrastructures
across all levels of interaction.
The HCI Appendix B3 establishes the detailed requirements for information to be
displayed by the UCS. The requirements detail the functions and interactions that the
UCS should allow the operator to perform.
Annex B Appendix B3 specifies the requirements levied upon the UCS, and does not
impose any requirements on Human Factors (HF) and ergonomics. However, Appendix
B3 provides a Style Guide, which aims to provide guidance on display techniques and
standards, and acts as a source of reference and best practice in HCI design.
The HCI complies with the NATO C3 Technical Architecture’s NC3 Common Standards
Profile (NCSP).

79

1.2. General Overview.
The HCI defines the requirements for the functions and interactions that the UCS
should allow the operator to perform. As illustrated in Figure B3 - 1, the HCI interface
will support any HCI requirements that are imposed on the CUCS by the Command and
Control Interface (CCI) and Data Link Interface (DLI). The HCI will also support any
specific or unique CCI Specific Module (CCISM) or Vehicle Specific Module (VSM)
display requirements.
The Human Computer Interface Specific Module (HCISM) provides the functionality for
the UCS operator(s) to interact with the CUCS via the HCI. The HCISM translates the
HCI data parameters from the CUCS to a form that can be understood by the
operators(s). It also allows the operator to interact with the CUCS by translating

AV

VSM
DLI

CORE
UCS

HCI

HCISM

OPERATOR

CCI
CCISM

C4I
SYSTEM

operator actions. This translation could be in the form of a visual display, auditory
warning, or physical interaction. The HCISM can also be considered the physical
realisation of the HCI (e.g., the set of
Figure B3 - 1. UCS Functional Architecture
controls and displays available to the operator(s)).
A key point to note is that there is no limit to how many HCISMs can be connected to a
single CUCS. As shown in Figure B3 - 2, multiple HCISMs can be connected to one
CUCS, though the individual HCISMs may have differing functionality depending on the
needs of the operator. A simple UCS may consist of a single HCISM/operator
configuration. To accommodate operators with different functionality needs, the system
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could consist of multiple HCISMs, each offering the specific functionality for the
operator. For example, control of the AV and the payload could be from a HCISM (dualworkstation in a shelter), although launch and control could be controlled from a
portable unit by a physically separated operator. Typically, in larger UCSs, there may
be multiple operators working from a single HCISM. For example, this could be a single
HCISM allowing the AV operator, payload operator, and a mission planner to control
and monitor the UAV.

Core UCS

HCI

HCI Implementation
Specific Module
(HCISM) #1

Operator
#1

Operator
#n

HCI Implementation
Specific Module
(HCISM) #2

Operator
#1

Operator
#n

HCI Implementation
Specific Module
(HCISM) #n

Operator
#1

Operator
#n

Figure B3 - 2. Physical Realisation of the HCI
Although a HCISM will have a physical implementation, Annex B Appendix B3 does not
impose any design requirements, however it does provide User Interface (UI) design
guidelines in the form of a Style Guide. This means that there are no restrictions to size,
form or components used in a HCISM. Example 1: a HCISM may be a dual workstation
in a shelter offering a high degree of functionality required by a High Altitude Long
Endurance (HALE) UAV, whereas a small portable unit (hand-held computer) used to
operate a Micro Air Vehicle (MAV) would also be considered a HCISM. Example 2: for
a maritime UCS, there may be a HCISM providing level 5 functionality, whilst lower
levels of functionality (level 1 or 2) could be required on other parts of the ship, which
may require a different HCISM.
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There may be a requirement for commonality in HCISMs across services and nations
for separate UCSs. This may result in higher productivity, shorter training time and
reduced development, operation and support costs.
Within this appendix, the applicable levels of interoperability (LOI) have been identified
for all requirements (both mandatory ‘shall’ and recommended ‘should’ statements).
This has the effect of clearly identifying what requirements the CUCS must be
compliant with in order to ensure the required LOI. To be interoperable to a particular
level, the CUCS shall be compliant with all the requirements stated for all the levels up
to that which is required (e.g., for level 4 interoperability, the CUCS shall have to
incorporate all requirements for levels 1, 2, 3 and 4).
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1.3 Appendix B3 Overview.
Appendix B3 organization is illustrated by Figure B3 - 3.

Core UCS

HCI

Section 2: Functional
Requirements
Section 3: User
Interface Requirements
Section 4: Design
Principles Style guide

HCI Implementation
Specific Module
(HCISM)

Operator
#1

Operator
#n

Figure B3 - 3 . Appendix B3 Overview
Section 2: Functional Requirements provides a set of mandatory requirements and
recommendations for the HCI to allow user interoperability between NATO Nations’
UAV assets. These are categorised under the following headings:
• 2.1 General Requirements
• 2.2 UCS Configuration
• 2.3 Mission Planning
• 2.4 Air Vehicle Control
• 2.5 Operator Control and Monitoring
• 2.6 Payload Control and Monitoring
• 2.7 Warnings, Cautions, and Advisories
• 2.8 Communications Management
• 2.9 Post Mission Reporting
Section 3: UI Requirements, provides standards for UI services to ensure a high degree
of application portability and to provide a consistent “look and feel” across multiple
implementations.
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Section 4: Design Principles, provides guidance material on the HF aspects of the HCI.
This section is not designed to be a set of mandatory requirements, but acts as a style
guide. This style guide defines the general design objectives for HF work, such as
Compatibility, Consistency, Memory, Structure, Feedback, Mental Workload and
Individualisation. It also provides a greater detail for these design objectives.

2 Functional Requirements.

2.1 General Requirements.
The operator shall be able to control, operate, and use the UCS and all the subsystems
and components contained therein, to their required extent for all specified
environmental conditions, and when the operator is clothed in the appropriate
personal/protective equipment (PPE).
The HCI shall allow the setting of threshold levels for system indicators. These may
include, but are not limited to:
•

Air Vehicle altitude and altitude rate of change

•

Fuel levels

•

Speed

•

Maximum G loading

When system indicator threshold levels are exceeded, the HCI shall indicate a Caution,
Warning, or Advisory to the operator.
The operator shall have the ability to enter and synchronise a time with the UAV
System and applicable C4I systems.
2.2 UCS Configuration.
The HCI should be able to accept and present VSM displays that are sent across the
DLI.
The HCI should be able to accept and present CCISM displays that are sent across the
CCI.
The HCI shall provide the operator with the ability to display, edit, and send any
message types that can be exchanged over the CCI with applicable C4I
systems. These message types are defined in CCI Appendix B2,
The HCI should provide the ability to automatically update tactical information displays
from incoming messages via the CCI. This display could be visual (e.g., on the map),
auditory, etc.
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All operators should have access to CCI message/report generation applications.
The HCI should provide common templates that enable the operator to create
messages to be sent across the CCI.
The HCI shall provide the operator with access to all peripheral systems that are
present in the UCS (e.g., video recorders, printers, etc).
The UCS shall provide redundancy in all operations, such that the loss of any one HCI
input device does not prohibit operation of any UCS function.
The HCI should maximise data re-use and minimise data re-entry.
When a discrete list of options for a given task exists, that list should be presented to
the operator to aid the appropriate response. It should be made obvious to the operator
whether there is a range of options that can be selected.
Common HCI templates should allow “auto fill” of the message fields to reduce operator
workload.
The HCI shall enable the operator to save default values and units that have been
specified for various displays and templates.
The operator shall be able to globally change the measurement units (e.g., change from
imperial units to metric, or Latitude/Longitude to Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM)
or Military Grid Reference System (MGRS)).
The HCI shall enable the operator to enter parameter sets that will adapt the UCS for
the vehicle type and the respective missions. It may include, but not be limited to, the
following capabilities:
•

Select the system functionality (e.g., operational/training/maintenance modes)

•

Filter and combine information to improve situational awareness (e.g.,
knowledge of the state of the system and its environment)

•

Import/translate the Mission Order (MO)/Air Tasking Order (ATO) and load the
appropriate data sets into the CUCS

•

Input the data/parameters for the number and types of AV and their payload
configurations that are to be controlled from the UCS

•

Provision of sufficient controls and displays to initiate all system Built-in-Tests
(BIT) and display the status

•

The capability to save/load the UCS set-up configuration information and revert
to a default set-up configuration

•

The ability to enable operator-initiated search for relevant procedures

•

Provide context sensitive help to inform the operator what type or range of data
is expected for a given display input
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•

The ability to select directional references, for example among true-, grid- and
magnetic north, and relative to the UCS platform

The system should provide the operator with relevant feedback of information within
an appropriate timeframe. The provision of feedback of information should not
impede system operation. Consequently, the user does not need to know when and
how to search for this information and does not need to invest in these actions.
Appropriate Priority Controls should be used for AV and Mission Payload functions
that require either quick accessibility or constant availability. Priority control devices
can include, but are not limited to:
•

Touch panels

•

Buttons

•

Switches

•

Joysticks

•

Keyboard shortcuts

The HCI shall provide adequate identification of all information displayed to the
operator.
The HCI should enable fast and easy access to the requested information with
adequate orientation cues and state explanation. It should correspond to the optimal
search strategy for the specific task and situation, (e.g., support several accurate
information acquisition processes for operators).
While the UCS is performing an automated procedure, the HCI should provide
appropriate information as to what it is doing and why, so that, for example, the user will
remain in the loop of task execution.
The HCI should prevent multiple operators from operating the same
application/procedures at any one time. However, the HCI should provide the ability to
allow other operators to view applications/procedures that are being used. The status
of these applications and procedures should be apparent.
The HCI should provide the operator with the ability to interact with a target database.
An example of this interaction may be entering and referencing target data co-ordinates
in conjunction with the map display.
2.3 Mission Planning.
Mission Planning includes all planning aspects of all phases of the mission contained in
the MO/ATO (e.g., pre-flight and in-flight for AV, payload, data link and
communications.)
The HCI shall enable the operator to create, edit, and save a mission plan(s).
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The HCI shall enable the operator to plan and validate the mission and review the
results of mission validation.
The HCI shall enable the operator to re-plan or update a current mission plan at any
time before or during flight.
The HCI shall be able to access any DLI/vehicle specific data required for mission
planning through the DLI and/or the CCI message interface.
The HCI shall provide the operator with the ability to upload mission plans to the AV.
The operator should have the ability to review selected mission plans prior to AV
upload.
The operator should have the ability to download mission plans from the AV.
The operator should be able to import mission plans via the CCI.
The operator should be able to export mission plans via the CCI.
Launch, recovery, handover, action, and normal waypoints shall be specified and easily
distinguishable from each other.
All contingency routes shall be easily distinguishable from operational and approved
scheduled routes.
Mission Plans should include route, contingency route, payload, communications,
Identify Friend or Foe (IFF), and navigation aid planning.
Constant altitude, infeasible, descending, ascending, and all other route segments
should be easily distinguishable.
The operator should be able to display flight corridors, controlled airspace and any
other relevant airspace co-ordination information.
The operator should be able to de-clutter the planning display to remove unnecessary
items.
The HCI should be able to display Time-on-Station information.
The HCI should provide the operator with the ability to print (hard-copy) mission plans.
The HCI should allow mission planning to take into account meteorological and
environmental conditions.
For imaging payloads, the HCI should be able to display payload search area
information such as expected visual acuity range due to atmospheric conditions, diurnal
transition periods for thermal imagery, lunar and solar terrain shadowing and basic flight
weather conditions.
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If the UAV is to be flown in civil airspace, the HCI shall enable the operator to generate
specific messages for submittal to appropriate ATC authority in accordance with Table
B2 - 1 Air Traffic Control Messages, Appendix B2 Command Control Interface.
2.4 Air Vehicle Control.
The operator shall have sufficient controls and displays to safely control and monitor all
vehicle systems and subsystems that require user monitoring or input. At a minimum
these shall include:
•

Airspeed

•

Altitude

•

Track/Heading

•

Current position

Additional systems that require monitoring may include, but are not limited to the
following:
•

Vehicle autopilot/stability augmentation system

•

Vehicle fuel system

•

Vehicle lights (e.g. strobe, hazard, anti-collision, navigation)

•

Vehicle identification system (e.g., IFF)

•

De-icing and anti-icing systems

•

Flight termination system

•

Sensor calibration

•

Electrical power system

•

Flight Control system

•

Propulsion system

•

Cooling system

•

Lift devices

•

Airborne and UCS data recorder

•

Landing gear

•

Automatic launch and recovery systems

The HCI shall provide the ability for the operator to perform pre-flight checks and to
acknowledge and confirm each step as necessary. The HCI shall provide the ability to
store the completed pre-flight checklist.
The HCI shall provide controls and displays for controlling/monitoring the air vehicle
attitude in all supported flight modes. These modes may include the following:
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•

Flight vector command consisting of heading, altitude, and speed controls

•

Manual control mode consisting of pitch, roll, yaw, throttle, and collective

The flight display should have the following controls (commanded) and status reports
(reported) available:
•

Commanded flight mode and reported flight mode

•

Commanded AV position and reported AV position

•

Commanded altitude and reported altitude

•

Commanded heading and reported heading

•

Commanded roll/bank angle and reported roll/bank angle

•

Commanded airspeed and reported airspeed

•

Commanded engine speed and reported engine speed

•

Commanded pitch angle and reported pitch angle

•

Reported Angle Of Attack (AOA)

•

Reported yaw

•

Reported vertical velocity

•

Fuel remaining/Fuel flow rate/Bingo fuel

•

Icing status

When automatic launch and recovery systems are employed, the HCI shall make
provision for the operator to abort launch and recovery.
Flight critical control/monitor displays shall be visible at all times while an AV is under
control.
The operator shall have the ability to pass AV control (handover) to another UCS and
monitor the status of the handover as per the process defined in Appendices B1 (DLI)
and B2 (CCI).
The operator should have the controls to implement contingency plans as necessary.
2.5 Operator Control and Monitoring.
The “Map” is considered a CUCS function. It provides the primary display for situational
awareness of a UAV mission, and geographic information for the mission planning.
The map shall be able to support the following map types:
•

Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) Geographic Information Exchange
Standard, STANAG 3809

•

Digital Feature Analysis Data (DFAD)
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•

World Geodetic System - 84 (WGS-84), Mil-Std 2401

4.4.2 UAV specific issues.
For UAV applications, task performance at the planning, monitoring, and control level
requires operators to interact with computer-based information displays. Thus, besides
more basic ergonomic aspects regarding information presentation and dialogue control,
additional guidelines are required. Important aspects are:
•

The information presentation should be clearly recognisable, requiring a minimal
amount of recording and interpretation by the operator.

•

The amount of interaction required from the operator should be minimal. Settings
should be limited in number and directly accessible.

•

The information presentation and dialogue, both within and across operator
interfaces, should be as consistent as possible.

In the following, important aspects relating to these compatibility and functionality
issues of the information presentation and human-computer dialogue will be specified in
more detail.
4.4.2.1 Information Presentation.
4.4.2.1.1 Compatibility.
According to the compatibility principle, the definition and layout of the different
information elements on the information display should be consistent with operator task
concepts and orientation. Depending on the different task levels (planning, monitoring,
and control) this principle may put different demands on the way information is
presented and arranged on the display. At the planning level, for instance, operator
orientation is likely to be more according to a World-Referenced Frame, defining the
goals to be achieved on the basis of absolute references. The information presentation
optimally supporting this world-referenced orientation might be of an exocentric nature,
where the display observation point (stationpoint) is independent of the momentary
operator viewpoint. On the other hand, at the control level, deviations between the
desired state and the actual state are to be compensated, which is a process in which
the momentary orientation and dynamical aspects of the operator/vehicle system play
an important role. In this process, the information display can assist by providing local
guidance according to an egocentric format, based on an Ego-Referenced Frame.
According to this presentation format, information is presented from the momentary
viewpoint of the operator.
Similarly, for the perception of dynamical aspects like state changes and motion,
different ways of information presentation may be discerned according to an inside-out
or outside-in model, based on the movement references used by the operator.
Especially at the control level, the Stimulus-Response compatibility principle will be
optimally supported if the same control actions always result in the same perception of
movement or manoeuvres. With an inside-out view, the perceived vehicle's movements
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will always be consistent with the control actions. When controlling from an outside-in
perspective, the operator will have to execute opposite control actions if the perceived
vehicle moves towards him, possibly causing confusion because of the mental rotation
involved.
4.4.2.1.2 Consistency.
The consistency principle requires the information presentation to be consistent within
and across displays, modules, programs, and information systems. Within display, this
implies consistency in the information coding applied, addressing issues like frames of
reference, scaling units, and principles for colour coding. Across displays and different
applications the principle may be extended to the use of harmonised representations
(location and layout) of the different functional fields defined on the displays.
4.4.2.1.3 Feedback.
In general, the feedback principle requires operators of computer-based systems to be
provided with information of where they are in the system, what they have done, and
the steps necessary to achieve a specific desired outcome. More specific, the primary
goal of the information displays for UAV applications is to provide operators with
additional feedback in the vehicle control and platform status monitoring processes.
This 'on-line' application may pose additional requirements on the design of the
feedback the operator is provided with. For instance, for an efficient monitoring and
control of a UAV mission, besides actual state information, additional information should
be present in the form of sufficient preview and history. In general, for the monitoring of
process variables the following types of information can be discerned:
•

Reference

•

Status

•

Reference change

•

Status change

•

Knowledge on future reference

•

Knowledge on future status

Furthermore, information should be presented in a timely way in order to build up a
proper image of the environment. For instance, task performance may become
degraded for low display update rates, because of insufficient feedback with regard to
vehicle status and operator input. The same holds true for chart manipulation, like
scaling and zooming.

4.4.2.2 Dialogue Design.
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4.4.2.2.1 Compatibility.
An important precondition in designing appropriate wording for commands, menus, and
error messages, is the need to be clear and unambiguous. Also, the meaning of graphic
icons should be clear and conform to existing population stereotypes.
4.4.2.2.2 Consistency.
The definition and placement of control panels and function keys should be consistent
across different screens and applications.
4.4.2.2.3 Structure.
The structuring of commands in different menu items should be functional and clear to
the operator. Important settings should be clearly recognisable and directly accessible
by the operator.
4.4.2.2.4 Feedback.
The operator should be provided with clear feedback of current selections and settings.
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APPENDIX F
TOMAHAWK REMOTE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
DESCRIPTION
(This information is excerpted from the FT-413 Mission Firing Plan)
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MISSION FIRING PLAN FOR
TOMAHAWK LAND ATTACK MISSILE (TACTICAL TOMAHAWK)
FLIGHT TEST LAUNCH NO. 413
(E-4:FT-413) (U)

FINAL EDITION
20 November 2003

Prepared by
Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division
Point Mugu, CA
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REMOTE COMMAND AND CONTROL (RCC) SYSTEM
DESCRIPTION
1.0 (U) AN/AST-5A FTS / RCC POD

(U) The AN/AST-5A FTS/RCC pod is used to generate UHF (425 MHz) flight
termination and command and control tones to an RSS-configured test missile. RCC
commands consist of a specified Inter-Range Instrumentation Group (IRIG) tone pair
modulated on the 425 MHz carrier that is transmitted to the RSS. Flight termination is
achieved by transmitting a specified series of tone pair commands to the test missile.
The pod is 82 inches long, 8 inches in diameter and weighs approximately 100 lbs. It is
captive-carried on QF-4, F-14, F-15, and F-16 chase aircraft, and is non-jettisonable.
Forward and aft transmitter sections are rotatable to allow for vertical antenna position
regardless of carriage aircraft or station. The pod requires a dedicated cockpit control
box in the chase aircraft.
(U) A switch in the aft section of the pod is used to select the operating mode of the box to
either Block III or Block IV, depending on which missile variant is being tested. This switch
must be pre-set on the ground during the upload/checkout process. With the pod selected to the
Block III mode, the default operating condition of the pod is to transmit the 425 MHz carrier
signal only. With the pod selected to the Block IV mode, the default operating condition of the
pod is to transmit the 425 MHz carrier signal with IRIG tone 5 continuously modulated on the
carrier.

Figure H-1. (U) AN/AST-5A pod.
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2.0 (U) COCKPIT CONTROL BOX FOR THE AN/AST-5A POD
(U) A cockpit control box is installed in the aft cockpit of the chase aircraft to
operate the AST-5A pod. A separate control box is required for each AST-5A pod
carried on the aircraft. The control box is operated by the Airborne Missile Flight Safety
Officer (AMFSO) crew member in the aft cockpit of the chase aircraft. The control box
is used to apply 28VDC power to the AST-5A pod, select the desired missile RCC
command, and initiate the flight termination sequence. In addition to the dedicated
pushbutton/rocker and toggle switch controls, the LED display also functions as a
pushbutton-operated switch to cycle through a display menu. An internal switch in the
control box is used to select the operating mode of the box, Block III or
Block IV, depending on which missile variant is being tested. This switch must be
preset during the installation process, and is not accessible in flight. The control box
contains hardware and software elements to control the operation of the box, and assist
the AMFSO operator in ensuring the proper command sequences are transmitted to the
missile. The functional logic for the control box varies depending on which operating
mode is selected as discussed in the following sections. The control box completes an
internal status test at power-up.
(U) The PWR, TERM and RCVY toggle switches are locking, and must be lifted to
transition the control between the off and on positions. The ZOOM toggle switch is
locking in the off position only; when released from the on position, the control
automatically returns to the off position. The pushbutton and rocker switch controls are
executed by firmly depressing the desired button for a minimum of 0.5 second, then
releasing. The three-axis COT/LOT/DOT and ACCL/LVL/ DECL, and five-axis
UP/DOWN/L/R/LVL rocker switches cannot be engaged in more than one axis
simultaneously. The lower edge of the LED control/display is depressed to cycle
through the menu options. To select the menu option on the display, the MENU EXEC
pushbutton must be depressed.

99

PWR

GUIDANCE
MODE

LVL

L

R
LVL

COT

DECL
GUIDE
MODE

LOT

UP

ACCL

TERM

MENU
EXEC

DOWN
RCVY

ZOOM

DOT

Figure H-2. (U) AN/AST-5A pod Cockpit Control Box.

3.0 (U) COCKPIT CONTROL BOX FUNCTIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
3.1 (U) General Functionality
(U) The pushbutton and rocker switch controls execute a given RCC command for
a minimum time when depressed for at least 0.2 second. The command execution time
will vary for each control as specified under its specific functionality. If depressed for
less than the 0.2 second threshold, no action will occur (no RCC command executed).
(U) The main control switches are wired in hierarchy preventing two commands
from being sent concurrently. The order of hierarchy is TERM, ZOOM, LVL,
DOWN/UP/LEFT/RIGHT, RCVY, COT/LOT/DOT, ACCL/DECL. The TERM,
RCVY and ZOOM controls are “directly” connected to the AST-5A Pod, and not
actuated using software or firmware within the Control Box. These Emergency
commands are immediately sent to the Pod and executed regardless of what other RCC
command may be active. Activation of one of these commands will discontinue any
currently active command function and immediately execute the Emergency command.
(U) The LED display/control has an integrated switch function that is actuated by
depressing the lower edge of the display. The switch function is used to cycle through a
set of menu options, which are then selected using the MENU EXEC pushbutton. At
power up, the display indicates the control box configuration (BLK 2/3 or BLK 4) and
box software version. Actuating the LED display switch function with the control box
Block III mode selected will cycle sequentially through the following menu options:
Prearm Disable -> Prearm Enable -> Initiated BIT -> mode/command readout.
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Actuating the switch function with the control box Block IV mode selected will cycle
sequentially through the following menu options: Prearm Disable -> Prearm Enable ->
Tone Test -> Initiated BIT -> mode/command readout. The function of each menu
option is discussed in the following sections.
•

Prearm Disable - Actuation of the MENU EXEC control when the Prearm
Disable menu option is displayed on the LED will execute the following
command sequence: Warhead Dis-Arm (tones 6 and 7) for 1.0 second; Quiescent
State for 0.1 second; Warhead Pre-Arm (tones 7 and 14) for 1.0 second;
Quiescent State for 0.1 second; Warhead Dis-Arm (tones 6 and 7) for 1.0 second.
While the Prearm Disable command sequence is executing, no subsequent
control actuations are recognized (except TERM, RCVY or ZOOM).

•

Prearm Enable - Actuation of the MENU EXEC control when the Prearm Enable
menu option is displayed will execute the following command sequence:
Warhead Pre-Arm (tones 7 and 14) for 1.0 second; Quiescent State for 0.1
second; Warhead Dis-Arm (tones 6 and 7) for 1.0 second; Quiescent State for 0.1
second; Warhead Pre-Arm (tones 7 and 14) for 1.0 second. While the Prearm
Enable command sequence is executing, no subsequent control actuations are
recognized (except TERM, RCVY or ZOOM).

•

Tone Test - Actuation of the MENU EXEC control when the Tone Test menu
option is displayed (control box Block IV mode only) will execute the following
command sequence: Optional command (tones 2 and 5) for 1.0 second;
Quiescent State (tone 5 only) for 1.0 second; Arm command (tones 1 and 5) for
1.0 second. This sequence is used early in the flight test to validate the tones
used in the flight termination sequence (1, 2 and 5). While the Tone Test
command sequence is executing, no subsequent control actuations are recognized
(except TERM, RCVY or ZOOM).

•

Control Box BIT - Actuation of the MENU EXEC control when the Tone Test
menu option is Control Box BIT menu option is displayed executes a
comprehensive internal system check of the control box hardware/software (no
AST-5A pod checks are completed). The AST-5A pod will continue to transmit
the UHF signal while this control box BIT is executing.
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3.2 (U) Control Box Block III Operating Modes
(U) Following is a description of the specific functionality for the Cockpit Control Box in
the Block III operating mode. The nominal control actuation and command timing sequences are
indicated.

3.2.1 (U) Control Box Block III Mission Mode
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Default control box mode when system is powered on.
Mode entered any other time upon actuation of the GUID MODE control.
Actuation of the GUID MODE control sends a Return To CMGS command.
Actuation of the COT control sends a Climb On-Track command.
Actuation of the LOT control sends a Maintain Altitude On-Track command.
Actuation of the DOT control sends a Descend On-Track command.
The ARM ENABL, ARM DISABL and BIT commands are valid/selectable via the
LED display control.
The TONE TEST command is not selectable via the LED display control.

3.2.2 (U) Control Box Block III Override Mode
•
•
•
•

Mode is entered upon actuation of override LVL control only.
While in mode, the ACCL, DECL, UP, DOWN, L, R, COT, LOT, DOT and GUID
MODE commands are automatically preceded by a Level command if the previous
command was not a Level.
Mode is exited (and Mission Mode entered) upon actuation of the GUID MODE
control only (command is automatically preceded by a Level if required).
The ARM ENABL, ARM DISABL, BIT and TONE TEST commands are
invalid/not selectable via the LED display control.

(U) The Return to CMGS command is selected using the GUID MODE (green)
colored pushbutton control. The Block II/III test missile requires that a Level command
precede the Return to CMGS command if the control box is in Block III Override Mode.
The Level command is selected by depressing the center position of either the 3-position
ACCL/LVL/DECL or 5-position UP/DOWN/L/R/LVL control. If the AMFSO has
already sent the Level command (or if the control box was not previously in Override
Mode), the Return to CMGS command is executed for 1.0 second. If the AMFSO does
not send the Level command, the control box automatically inserts a Level command.
When an “auto-Level” command sequence is required, the control box executes the
following command sequence: Level command for 0.7 second; Quiescent State for 0.1
second; Return to CMGS command for 1.0 second. While this command sequence is
executing, no subsequent control actuations are recognized (except TERM, RCVY or
ZOOM).
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(U) The On-Track commands (COT, LOT and DOT) are selected using the 3position rocker switch. If the control box is in Block III Mission Mode, actuation of the
On-Track command sends the specified command for 1.0 second. If the control box is
in Block III Override Mode, the Block II/III test missile requires that a Level command
precede the On-Track command. If the AMFSO has already sent the Level command,
the specified On-Track command is sent for 1.0 second. If the AMFSO does not send
the Level command, the control box automatically inserts a Level command. When an
“auto-Level” command sequence is required, the control box executes the following
command sequence: Level command for 0.7 second; Quiescent State for 0.1 second;
COT/LOT/DOT command for 1.0 second. While this command sequence is executing,
no subsequent control actuations are recognized (except TERM, RCVY or ZOOM).
(U) The Override commands are selected using either the 3-position rocker switch
(ACCL, LVL and DECL) or the 5-position rocker switch (UP, DOWN, L, R, LVL).
The Block II/III test missile requires that a Level command precede any override
command. The Level command is selected by depressing the center position of either
the 3-position ACCL/LVL/DECL or 5-position UP/DOWN/L/R/LVL control. If the
AMFSO has already sent the Level command, the selected override command is
executed for 1.0 second. If the AMFSO does not send the Level command, the control
box automatically inserts a Level command. When an “auto-Level” command sequence
is required, the control box executes the following command sequence: Level command
for 0.7 second; Quiescent State for 0.1 second; selected override command for 1.0
second. While this command sequence is executing, no subsequent control actuations
are recognized (except TERM, RCVY or ZOOM).
(U) The Emergency commands (TERM, RCVY and ZOOM) are selected using the
two-position locking toggle switches. The RCVY toggle does not lock in the ON
position, and automatically returns back to the OFF position when released. Actuation
of the Terminate command sends the flight termination tone command sequence.
Actuation of the Recover sends the recover tone command for 1.0 second. Actuation of
the Zoom command sends the zoom tone command for a minimum of 1.0 second, and
continues sending the command as long as the toggle switch is in the ON position.

3.3 (U) Control Box Block IV Operating Modes
(U) Following is a description of the specific functionality for the AN/AST-5A
Cockpit Control Box in the Block IV operating mode. The nominal control actuation
and command timing sequences are indicated.
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3.3.1 (U) Control Box Block IV Mission Mode
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Default control box mode when system is powered on.
Mode entered any other time upon actuation of the COT, LOT, DOT or GUID
MODE controls.
Actuation of the GUID MODE control sends a Return To Guidance command.
Actuation of the COT control sends a Climb On-Track command.
Actuation of the LOT control sends a Maintain Altitude On-Track command.
Actuation of the DOT control sends a Descend On-Track command.
The ARM ENABL, ARM DISABL, BIT and TONE TEST commands are
valid/selectable via the LED display control.
3.3.2 (U) Control Box Block IV Override Mode

•
•
•
•

Mode is entered upon actuation of override LVL control only.
While in mode, the ACCL, DECL, UP, DOWN, L or R controls send the designated
command directly (no automatic Level command sent).
Mode is exited (and Mission Mode entered) upon actuation of the GUID MODE,
COT, LOT or DOT controls (no automatic Level command sent).
The ARM ENABL, ARM DISABL, BIT and TONE TEST commands are
invalid/not selectable via the LED display control.
(U) The Return to Guidance command is selected using the GUID MODE (green)
colored pushbutton control. The Block IV test missile does not require that a Level
command precede the Return to Guidance command, regardless of the mode the control
box is in. Actuation of the GUID MODE control sends the Return to Guidance
command for 1.0 second. While the command is being sent, no subsequent control
actuations are recognized (except TERM, RCVY or ZOOM).
(U) The On-Track commands (COT, LOT and DOT) are selected using the 3position rocker switch. Selection of an On-Track command sends the selected command
for 1.0 second. While the command is being sent, no subsequent control actuations are
recognized (except TERM, RCVY or ZOOM).
(U) The Override commands are selected using either the 3-position rocker switch
(ACCL, LVL and DECL) or the 5-position rocker switch (UP, DOWN, L, R, LVL).
The Block IV test missile does not require that a Level command precede an override
command. Selection of an Override command sends the selected override command for
1.0 second. While this command is being sent, no subsequent control actuations are
recognized (except TERM, RCVY or ZOOM).
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(U) The Emergency commands (TERM, RCVY and ZOOM) are selected using the
two-position locking toggle switches. The RCVY toggle does not lock in the ON
position, and automatically returns back to the OFF position when released. Actuation
of the Terminate command sends the flight termination tone command sequence. The
Recover command is not used by the Block IV test missile. Actuation of the Recover
command with the control box in the Block IV operating mode results in no action (no
command sent). Actuation of the Zoom command sends the zoom tone command for
1.0 second.
4.0 (U) AN/AST-5A POD SYSTEM PREFLIGHT CHECKOUT PROCEDURES
(U) After uploading the pod and installing the cockpit control box, the operation of
the AST-5A pod system is verified by the pod ground technicians. A test set is used by
the ground crew to receive, decode and display the FTS and RCC commands. The test
set is also used to verify that the proper Block III or Block IV modes are set on the pod
and the control box. After engine start, the AMFSO completes a series of “ground RCC
checks” prior to taxi. During the RCC checks, the AMFSO cycles through all of the
FTS/RCC command sequences, and the IRIG tones and control sequences are verified
by the pod ground technicians.
(U) After takeoff, a series of “airborne RCC checks” are completed by the
AMFSO. During these checks, a specified sequence of commands are sent from the
pod, and received by the range. The tone sequences are decoded and verified by the
range. The airborne RCC checks are repeated for each pod carried by the chase aircraft.
5.0 (U) BLOCK IV RCC SYSTEM OPERATION
5.1 (U) Block IV RCC Control Modes
(U) The Block IV RCC control modes enable varying levels of control of key test
missile parameters during a flight test. RCC functions may be executed from either a
chase aircraft or a ground station. The RCC control modes are described in the
following sections:
•

GUIDANCE Mode – The test missile’s altitude, ground track, airspeed and all
mission events are executed according to the pre-planned mission data, with no
intervention by the AMFSO.

•

ON-TRACK Mode – RCC On-Track commands are used by the AMFSO to control
the test missile’s altitude. Ground track and airspeed are executed according to the
pre-planned mission data. Some mission events such as Terrain Contour Matching
(TERCOM) or Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC) updates may not
execute properly while in this mode.
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•

OVERRIDE Mode – RCC Override commands are used by the AMFSO to enable
complete control the test missile’s altitude, ground track and airspeed (Mach
command). Significant mission events including TERCOM/DSMAC updates,
satellite communications and warhead arming/fuzing are disabled while in this
mode.

•

EMERGENCY Mode – RCC Emergency commands are used by the AMFSO to
initiate an immediate response for test missile malfunctions or hazards.

5.2 (U) Block IV RCC Command Features
•

TERMINATE command is enabled at launch. The solid rocket booster will
continue to burn if TERMINATE is commanded during the boost phase. For
Block IV test missiles, there is no response to a RECOVER command.

•

All other RCC commands are enabled 14.5 seconds after booster jettison.

•

The quiescent state (valid RF carrier with continuous tone 5) must be present
before any command is recognized (except for Emergency commands:
RECOVER, ZOOM, and TERMINATE).

•

RCC commands must be recognized by missile for at least 0.5 second to be
accepted.

5.3 (U) On-Track Mode
•

On-Track Mode may only be entered from either the Guidance Mode or the Override Mode, by
sending a COT, LOT, or DOT command.

•

On-Track Mode may be exited at any time by sending a ZOOM, TERM, LVL, or
GUID MODE command. A LVL will enable the Override Mode; a GUID
MODE will return to the Guidance Mode.

•

The COT, LOT and DOT commands may be executed sequentially in any order
as desired. A quiescent state must separate each command that is sent. If
sequential On-Track commands are not separated by a quiescent state, the
missile will disregard the second command.

•

Do not have to repeat PREARM ENABLE sequence if On-Track Mode entered.
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Table H-1. (U) On-Track Flight Mode Commands.
Control
COT

Tone
Pair
12-15

LOT

12-13

DOT

11-12

Tone Test

2-5

GUID MODE

13-15

Prearm Enable

7-14,
6-7,
7-14

Prearm Disable

6-7,
7-14,
6-7

Action
CLIMB ON-TRACK: Climb at 50 fps while
maintaining mission ground track. Terrain
clearance provided to hold 500 ft AGL min
altitude.
LEVEL ON-TRACK: Maintain current altitude
and mission ground track. Terrain clearance
provided to hold 500 ft AGL min altitude.
DESCEND ON-TRACK: Descend at 50 fps while
maintaining mission ground track. Terrain
clearance provided to hold 500 ft AGL min
altitude.
Used to validate flight termination tones. Selected
via the LED control.
RETURN TO CMGS/Guidance: Activate
Guidance Mode; Return control of mission events
to the missile and execute the preplanned mission.
PREARM ENABLE: Enable warhead events
including arming sequence. Command sequence
actuated via LED control. Must be repeated if
Override Mode activated.
PREARM DISABLE: Disable warhead/payload
events. Command sequence actuated via the LED
control.

•

Override Mode is entered from the Guidance or On-Track modes upon receiving
a valid LVL command.

•

The Override Mode commands (LVL, ACCL, DECL, UP, DOWN, L, R) may be
executed sequentially in any order as desired. A quiescent state must separate
each command that is sent. If sequential Override commands are not separated
by a quiescent state, the second command will disregarded.

•

Override Mode may be exited and Guidance Mode entered by sending a GUID
MODE command. On-Track Mode may be entered by sending a COT, LOT, or
DOT command. Will have to repeat PREARM ENABLE sequence if applicable.
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Table H-2. (U) Override Flight Mode Commands.
Control
LVL

Tone
Pair
6-15

UP

7-8

DOWN

6-12

L

8-14

R

8-12

DECL

7-12

ACCL

8-11

Action
LEVEL: Activate Override Mode and maintain current
altitude, heading and Mach command. Terrain
clearance provided to hold 500 ft AGL min altitude.
UP: Command 100 fps climb rate while maintaining
current heading and Mach command. Terrain
clearance provided to hold 500 ft AGL min altitude.
DOWN: Command 30 fps descent rate while
maintaining current heading and Mach command.
Terrain clearance provided to hold 500 ft AGL min
altitude.
LEFT TURN: Command 40 deg left bank angle while
maintaining current altitude and Mach command.
Terrain clearance provided to hold 500 ft AGL min
altitude.
RIGHT TURN: Command 40 deg right bank angle
while maintaining current altitude and Mach command.
Terrain clearance provided to hold 500 ft AGL min
altitude.
DECELERATE: Command 0.4 Mach while
maintaining current altitude and heading. Terrain
clearance provided to hold 500 ft AGL min altitude.
Missile will not decelerate below preplanned minimum
Mach for mission segment.
ACCLERATE: Command 0.9 Mach while maintaining
current altitude and heading. Terrain clearance
provided to hold 500 ft AGL min altitude. Mission
data may include an upper Mach limit.
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5.5 (U) Emergency Commands

•

EMERGENCY commands may be initiated from any mode, or during the execution
of any other command.

•

Quiescent state not necessary prior to sending an EMERGENCY command.
Table H-3. (U) Emergency Commanded Responses.
Control
RCVY

Tone
Pair
6-11

ZOOM

14-15

Action
RECOVERY: Not used for Block IV missile (no response).
ZOOM: Used to command max performance climb.
Commands climb at 300 fps and 0.7 Mach, then levels at
altitude when one of the following conditions met:
• alt = b/u inertial altitude + 2,000 ft (Guid/On-Track
Modes)
• alt = 12,000 ft MSL (Override Mode)
If Zoom commanded from Guidance or On-Track Mode, the
missile will continue to follow the mission ground track during
the Zoom maneuver. If commanded from Override Mode, the
missile will maintain heading during the maneuver.
To discontinue Zoom sequence prior to completion, ZOOM
toggle switch must be in off position:
• command LVL, GUID MODE or LOT if Zoom
enabled from Guidance or On-Track Mode.
• command LVL if Zoom enabled from Override Mode.
TERM command will also discontinue Zoom sequence,
regardless of ZOOM toggle switch position.

TERM

1-5,
then
1-2

TERMINATE: Used to rapidly terminate controlled flight of
missile. Commands throttle to off and rudder to maximum
deflection.

The backup inertial altitude is specified within the mission plan data for each route
segment. The backup inertial altitude may change while a Zoom sequence is being
executed. If the new backup inertial + 2,000 ft threshold altitude is below the current
altitude, the missile will not descend.
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5.6 (U) Block IV Lost RCC Signal Sequence
5.6.1 (U) Guidance / On-Track Modes - Overwater or Government Test Range
Time = 0 sec
Time = 60 secs
Time = 180 secs

RCC monitor signal lost; start Loss of Tone recognition delay.
Loss of Tone recognition delay complete; begin climb at 100 fps.
Initiate flight termination sequence.

Missile will climb towards mission-specified backup inertial + 2,000 ft. If backup inertial
+
2,000 ft is below current altitude, missile will maintain current altitude. Climb will continue until
flight termination automatically executed after 180 seconds. If missile reaches backup inertial
altitude + 2,000 ft before 180 seconds, missile will level at that altitude and continue to follow
the mission ground track until the time delay expires.

One second of valid RCC monitor signal will discontinue the Loss of Tone sequence and
continue the mission in Guidance Mode or level the missile in On-Track Mode,
depending on which mode the missile was in when signal was lost.
5.6.2 (U) Guidance / On-Track Modes - Over Public Land Areas
Time = 0 sec
Time = 10 secs
Time = 50 secs

RCC monitor signal lost; start Loss of Tone recognition delay.
Loss of Tone recognition delay complete; begin climb at 100 fps.
Initiate flight termination sequence.

Over public land areas, the Loss of Tone implementation will be the same as discussed
above for overwater or Government test range except for the timing of the sequence.
5.6.3

(U) Override Mode

Time = 0 sec
Time = 10 secs
Time = 50 secs

RCC monitor signal lost; start Loss of Tone recognition delay
Loss of Tone recognition delay complete; begin climb at 100 fps.
Initiate flight termination sequence.

Missile will climb towards 12,000 ft MSL. Climb will continue until Terminate
automatically executed after 50 seconds. If missile reaches 12,000 ft MSL before 50
seconds, missile will level at that altitude and maintain heading until the time expires. If
missile current altitude is higher than 12,000 ft MSL, missile will maintain current
altitude until time expires.
One second of valid RCC monitor signal will discontinue the Loss of Tone sequence and
continue the mission in Override Mode (Level).
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